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Collin: Antitrust Law

ANTITRUST COMMON LAW: RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS AND REASONABLENESS
by
THoMAs J. COLLIN*

Restrictive covenants are integral to countless commercial transactions. As
contracts in restraint of trade,' they are not favored. A restrictive covenant may
be enforceable, however, if reducing competition is necessary to achieve the main
purpose of a transaction. The restraint is then considered ancillary to the main
purpose, and the covenant will be enforced if the restraint is reasonable. The
enforceability of contracts restraining trade has been a subject of centuries of case
law, and it is governed, outside of statutory prohibitions,2 by what is referred to

as the ancillary restraint doctrine.
This article will review the ancillary restraint doctrine in Ohio. It will do so
by focusing on the three settings in which restrictive covenants are commonly,
and most frequently, used and from which the vast majority of the case law has
emerged: (1) the sale of a business; (2) leasing; and (3) employment. As the
following discussion will show, analysis of ancillary restraints should be uniform
even though the subjects of restrictive covenants may differ.
Under controlling decisions by the Ohio Supreme Court, the test of

reasonableness of a restraint is pragmatic: Is the restraint no greater than that
needed to protect the legitimate interests of the covenantee and at the same time
consistent with the public interest? This article will show that conventional
antitrust rule of reason analysis should be followed in evaluating restrictive covenants. Although there is no need to import federal antitrust statutory analysis into
ancillary restraint analysis, the focus of inquiry should be the same -- the

"B.A., University of Minnesota 1970; A.M., Harvard University 1972; J.D., GeorgetownUniversity 1974.
Mr. Collin is a member of the Ohio Bar and a partner in the Cleveland office of Thompson, Hine and
Flory. The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to James B. Niehaus, a member of the Ohio Bar,
associate in the Cleveland office of Thompson, Hine and Flory and a 1983 graduate of University of
Notre Dame Law School, for his invaluable assistance in the writing of this article.
' A contract or bargain is in restraint of trade "when its performance would limit competition in any
business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation". RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 513
(1932). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAS (1981) is to the same effect Id. at § 186(2). See
generally 6A A. CORYIN, CONTRACrS §§ 1379-81 (1962); 14 S. WILusTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACrS §§ 1633-37 (3d ed. 1972).
'Ile enforceability of contracts in restraint of trade is also a subject of federal and Ohio antitrust statutes,
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)) and the Valentine Act (OHIo REV. CODE §§ 1331.01
et seq.), respectively. The impact of these statutes on the ancillary restraints discussed in this article will
be addressed where appropriate in the following pages.
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competitive impact of the restraint. Do the competitive benefits of a restraint
outweigh the actual or potential competition foreclosed?

Before reviewing the criteria for evaluating ancillary restraints, it will prove
instructive to survey briefly the common law background from which Ohio law
has developed, followed by a review of early decisions by the United States
Supreme Court. Controlling decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court will then be
addressed, followed by a consideration of the case law3 on various categories of

restrictive covenants.
I. Common Law Background
By the time Mitchel v. Reynolds4 was decided by the Queen's Bench in 1711,

it was already well-established that not all contracts in restraint of trade were
unenforceable. We will look very briefly at the test of enforceability that had
evolved in the English courts by the mid-nineteenth century, when the United
States and Ohio Supreme Courts first addressed ancillary restraints.
The court considered in Mitchel v. Reynolds whether a promise was
enforceable by the assignor of a lease of a bake shop that the assignor, a baker,
would not engage in the baker's business in a London parish for the five-year

term of the lease. Noting that there was a presumption that all restraints of trade

were invalid and therefore unenforceable, 5 the court nonetheless held that the
promise was enforceable because it was reasonable. It protected the purchaser of

'Pursuant to Rule 2(E) of the Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions, unpublished decisions
by Ohio's intermediate courts of appeals have no controlling authority except as between the parties to
the decisions. Because of the comparatively large body of unpublished appellate case law, however, these
opinions necessarily need to be consulted if any accurate view of Ohio law, as applied by the courts, is
to be gained: "What constitutes the law? . .. The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 0. HoLMEs, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 172-73
(1920). Unpublished decisions will be cited and discussed in this article on the same footing as published
decisions.
4 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711)
5 Contracts in restraint of trade were not indictable at common law. Even if a contract was "general" or
otherwise unreasonable, the only consequence was that the parties could not call upon the courts for
assistance in enforcing it See generally W. TAFr, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND TH E SUPREME COURT 1121 (1914); H. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POucY 17-20 (1954); Dewey, The Common-Law
Background of Antitrust Policy, 41 VA. L REV. 759. 771-83 (1955). See also State ex rel. Monnett v.
Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 520,546, 56 N.E. 464, 467 (1900); Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie,
35 Ohio St. 666, 671-72 (1880). There was no criminal liability for any such contract, see, e.g., State ex
rel. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. at 546, 56 N.E. at 467; W. TAFr, THE ANTI-TRUST
ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT at 20-21, and no private cause of action for any third party injured as a
result of performance of the contract, see, e.g., Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 21 Q.B.D. 544,
554 (1888), affd, 23 Q.B.D. 598, 632 (C.A. 1889), affd, [1892] A.C. 25 (1891); Runck v. Cloud, 8 Ohio
N.P. 436, 444 (Super. Ct 1901); H. THORELu, FEDERAL ANITrRUST PouCY at 34; Hovenkamp, The2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
Sherman Act and the ClassicalTheory of Competition, 74 IoWA L. REV. 1019, 1030-44 (1989).
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the business from unfair competition at the hands of the seller, competition that
could destroy the value of the business to the buyer.6
In the course of reviewing the law governing the validity of such a promise,
the court volunteered that a restraint of trade could be enforceable if it were
"partial", as opposed to "general".
A general restraint would prohibit an
individual from engaging in his trade throughout all of England. A partial
restraint, in contrast, would not entirely foreclose an individual from practicing
his profession. In the case before the court, the restraint was partial, and therefore
enforceable, because it restrained the seller only from engaging in the baking
profession in a single parish!
Even a partial restraint might not be enforceable if it were unreasonable,
however. A practical test of reasonableness was later announced in Homer v.
Graves.9 Reviewing the enforceability of a contract restraining a dentist from
engaging in his practice within one hundred miles of the city of York, the court
observed that Mitchel v. Reynolds had been the leading case on contracts in
restraint of trade from the time of its decision "to the present"' 0 After noting
that the contract under review did not amount to a general restraint of trade that
would be clearly unenforceable under the authority of Mitchel v. Reynolds -because the dentist was free to engage in his trade as long as he did so more than
100 miles from the city of York -- the court focused on whether the restraint was
reasonable. Speaking through Chief Justice Tindal, the court proposed this test,
subsequently nearly universally followed:
And we do not see how a better test can be applied to the question
whether reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint is
such only as to afford a fair protection to the interests of the party in
favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the
interests of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary
protection of the party, can be of no benefit to either, it can only be
oppressive; and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable.
Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public is void, on the grounds
of public policy."

'1 P. Wins. at 182, 197, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348, 352. This case is discussed at length in Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 629-37 (1960).
1 P. Wins. at 182, 185, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348, 349.
Id. at 182, 197, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348, 352.
9 7 Bingham 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (1831).
' 07 Bingham at 741, 131 Eng. Rep. at 286.
" 7 Bingham
at 743, 131 Eng. Rep.1991
at 287
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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The formulation of the ancillary restraint doctrine reflected in these two
leading cases underwent refinement and revision in the English courts in the 19th
and early 20th centuries, particularly as applied to post-employment restraints. 12.
Nonetheless, the earliest United States Supreme Court and Ohio decisions
restraints drew directly upon Mitchel v.
addressing the enforceability of ancillary
3
Reynolds and Homer v. Graves.
II. Early United States Supreme Court Decisions
As the following discussion of early Ohio Supreme Court decisions will
show, 4 the Ohio court drew initially on English precedents in its analysis of
restrictive covenants. It did not consult United States Supreme Court decisions,
but a brief review of key decisions by that court will prove useful in understanding the jurisprudential context in which the Ohio case law developed. Both courts
followed the same English precedents, and their analyses advanced along parallel
paths.
The United States Supreme Court considered in Oregon Steam Navigation
Company v. Winsor" whether a restraint on competition by the purchaser of a
steamship was enforceable. The Oregon Steam Navigation Company had
purchased the steamer New World from the California Steam Navigation
Company on condition that it would not use it in the waters of California for a
period of ten years after purchase.1 6 Oregon Steam then sold the boat to Winsor
subject to the same restriction on its use. Oregon Steam filed an action against
Winsor for breach of the covenant and recovery of liquidated damages7 upon
learning that Winsor was carrying freight and passengers into California.1
In evaluating the enforceability of the covenant, the Court described the
controlling principles as follows:
It is a well-settled rule of law that an agreement in general restraint of
trade is illegal and void; but an agreement which operates merely in
12 See

generally I E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw §§ 2.6 - .12 (1980); H. THORELL, supra

note 5, at 17-20, Blake, supra note 6, at 637-47; Eaton, On Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 128, 129-35 (1890); Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHL L

REV. 355, 373-79 (1954).
13 For a detailed review of the law of ancillary restraints as it had evolved in the English courts by the
middle of the nineteenth century, see generally H. THORELLL supra note 5, at 17-20; Blake, supra
note 6, at 629-42; Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L REV. 244, 245-48
(1928); Eaton, supra note 12, at 129-34; Kerr, Contractsin Restraint of Trade, 22 AM. L REV. 873, 880-

88 (1888); Letwin, supra note 12, at 373-79.
"4See infra notes 39-85 and accompanying text.
'5 87 U.S.(20 Wall.) 64 (1873).
6Id.
at 65.
17 Id. at 66.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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partial restraint of trade is good, provided it be not unreasonable and
there be a consideration to support it. In order that it may not be
unreasonable, the restraint imposed must be not larger than is required for
the necessary protection of the party with whom the contract is made. A
contract, even on good consideration, not to use a trade anywhere in
England, is held void in that country, as being too general a restraint of
trade; but a contract not to use a trade at a particular place, if it be
founded on a good consideration, and be made for a proper and useful
purpose, is valid. Of course, a contract not to exercise a trade generally
would be obnoxious to the rule, and would be void.' 8
After acknowledging the difficulty of applying these general principles in any
particular case, the Court held that the covenant before it was enforceable because
"its object and purpose was simply to protect the vendors".' 9 Although the
Court did not cite Mitchel v. Reynolds in its analysis, it cited and followed
Homer v. Graves" for the proposition that the restraint imposed must not be
larger than what is required for the protection of the party imposing the
restraint. 2'
The Court had occasion in Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Company2 to apply
the teachings of both Oregon Steam Navigation Company and Mitchel v.
Reynolds. It there reviewed an action to enforce a contract between two publicly
regulated utilities in Baltimore, Consolidated Gas Company and Equitable GasLight Company, to fix the price of gas to consumers.23 Plaintiff, Gibbs, sought
to recover compensation for services alleged to have been rendered by him to
Consolidated Gas Company in securing the contract between it and Equitable
Gas-Light Company.24
Recognizing that the contract in question eliminated competition between the
two utilities,2 5 the Court turned to consider whether, as a contract in restraint of
trade, it could nonetheless be enforced as reasonable. Citing Mitchel v. Reynolds,
the Court observed that if "public welfare ... be not involved" and the restraint
"Id. at 66-67 (footnotes omitted). The Court's characterization of contracts in general restraint of trade
as "illegal" simply signified that they were unenforceable. Prior to passage of the Shennan Act (15
U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1982)) in 1890 and comparable state antitrust laws, including the Valentine Act (OHIo
REv. CODE §§ 1331.01 et seq.), there was no criminal liability for restraints of trade. See generally supra

note 5.
'9 Id. at 71-72.
20 7 Bingham 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (1831).
21 Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 67 (1873).
2
23

130 U.S. 396 (1889).
Id. at 398-99.

zId.

at 403.

Published
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is no greater than needed for protection of the other party, the contract may be
enforced as reasonable.2 6 The Court went on to quote from Justice Bradley's
opinion in Oregon Steam Navigation Company on the circumstances under which
a contract in restraint of trade will be enforced,2 7 but it concluded that there
could be no possible justification for enforcement of a contract in restraint of
trade between two public utilities which is "manifestly prejudicial to the public
interest" .28 The Court declined to permit Gibbs to collect any fee for his "efforts
to accomplish what the law declared should not be done".2 9
Later in the same term, the Court applied in Fowle v. Park" the same
analysis to a contract restricting the sale of medicine. It was there alleged that
John D. Park had entered into an agreement with Seth and Lucy Fowle whereby
he transferred the exclusive right to sell Wistar's Balsam of Wild Cherry west of
the Rocky Mountains. 3' The promise was subsequently breached, and the
Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether the contract was enforceable.
Relying upon Gibbs, Mitchel v. Reynolds and Oregon Steam Navigation
Company, the Court had no difficulty concluding that the restriction was
enforceable because reasonable:
Relating as these contracts did to a compound involving a secret in its
preparation; based as they were upon a valuable consideration, and limited as to the space within which, though unlimited as to the time for
which, the restraint was to operate, we are unable to perceive how they
could be regarded as so unreasonable as to justify the court in declining
to enforce them.
The vendors were entitled to sell to the best advantage, and in so
doing to exercise the right to preclude themselves from entering into
competition with those who purchased, and to prevent competition
between purchasers; and the purchasers were entitled to such protection
as was reasonably necessary for their benefit.... The policy of the law
is to encourage useful discoveries by securing their fruits to those who
make them. If the public found the balsam efficacious, they were
interested in not being deprived of its use, but by whom it was sold was
32
unimportanL

26

Id. at 409.

27 id.
23
29

Id.-at 410.
Id. at 412.

" 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
31Id.

at 90.

32 Id. at 97.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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Even though it held that the restriction was reasonable, it remanded the case for
further proceedings to determine whether in fact it had been breached. 3
The Court's analysis is instructive in its attention to the public benefits
occasioned by securing to the discoverer of a useful product the rewards of its
exploitation. This was, in the Court's view, a salutary objective, and it made the
covenant reasonable. True, it restrained competition in the production of Wistar's
Balsam of Wild Cherry, but it contributed to make the covenantees stronger,
presumably, in the larger product market in which they competed for the dollars
of consumers. The analysis implies the need to evaluate reasonableness by taking
into account a restraint's competitive effects, not just its immediate impact on the
covenantor.
By the time Judge Taft wrote his survey of the ancillary restraint doctrine in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,' affirmed by the Supreme Court,
he was able to identify authoritatively five circumstances when contracts in partial
restraint of trade would be upheld as reasonable:
For the reasons given, then, covenants in partial restraint of trade are
generally upheld as valid when they are agreements (1) by the seller of
property or business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to
derogate from the value of the property or business sold; (2) by a retiring
partner not to compete with the firm; (3) by a partner pending the
partnership not to do anything to interfere, by competition or otherwise,
with the business of the firm; (4) by the buyer of property not to use the
same in competition with the business retained by the seller; and (5) by
an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his master or employer
after the expiration of his time of service."
Immediately before quoting Chief Justice Tindal's formulation of the test of
reasonableness, 36 Judge Taft emphasized that the restraints are enforceable
because they are ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract:
It would be stating it too strongly to say that these five classes of
covenants in restraint of trade include all of those upheld as valid at the
common law; but it would certainly seem to follow from the tests laid

33Id. at 97-99.
3485

F. 271 (6th Cit. 1898), aff d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The court reviewed in Addyston Pipe & Steel

Co. whether a price-fixing agreement among six manufacturers of cast-iron pipe for the purpose of
preventing the "evils of ruinous competition", i&Lat 279, was unenforceable at common law and,
consequently, a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), id. at 278-79.
" Id. at 281.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
36See supra note 11 and accompanying text for Chief Justice Tindal's formulation.
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down for determining the validity of such an agreement that no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying

it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and
necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate
fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use
of those fruits by the other party. 7
This general formulation of the ancillary restraint doctrine continues to be
followed to this day.38
III. Ohio Supreme Court Decisions -- 1853 to 1898.
With this outline before us of the general state of the common law of
ancillary restraints at the end of the 19th century, it is appropriate to turn now to
a review of controlling Ohio decisions. As will be seen, the Ohio Supreme Court,

in common with the United States Supreme Court, evaluated contracts in restraint
of trade consistently with the tests earlier developed by the English courts.
The Ohio Supreme Court had its first occasion to consider the enforceability
of a restrictive covenant in Lange v. Werk.39 Werk and Lange had been

members of a partnership engaged in the manufacture of stearin and candles. The
partnership was dissolved, and Lange sold his interest to Werk and promised that
he would not engage in the manufacture of candles or stearin in Hamilton County
or anywhere else in the United States prior to January 1, 1846, some two and
one-half years from the date of the sale.40 The covenant was later breached, and
Werk filed an action to recover liquidated damages.
37 85 F. at 282. Judge Taft explained subsequently that while it is "conceivable" that there may be other
situations in which contracts in restraint of trade were enforceable at common law other than these five
categories, he conceded that he was unable to find any other instances. W. TAFr, supra note 5, at 10.
For another detailed judicial survey of the law of contracts in restraint of trade in the last decade of the
19th century, see United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 F 58, 68-72 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd
on other grounds, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
38 Judge Bork, commenting upon Judge Taft's formulation of the ancillary restraint doctrine, recently

explained its continuing application as follows:
To be ancillary... an agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and collateral
to a separate, legitimate transaction. The ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral in the
sense that it serves to make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose.
Of course, the restraint imposed must be related to the efficiency sought to be achieved. If it
is so broad that part of the restraint suppresses competition without creating efficiency, the
restraint is, to that extent, not ancillary.
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987). Accord, e.g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265-69 (7th Cir.
1981)(ancillary restraint doctrine applied to evaluate reasonableness, under Section 1 of Sherman Act, of
restrictive covenant incident to sale of business), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982). See generally 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANTrrRUST LAW 703b (1978); Bork, AncillaryRestraints and the Sherman Act,
15 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW PROCEEDINGS 211 (1959).
39 2 Ohio St 520 (1853)
40
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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The court began its analysis with an extended discussion of Mitchel v.
Reynolds. It excused the emphasis on the case by explaining that "it contains the
substance of all the English cases" and that, as well, "it seems to us to place the
whole matter upon the true ground". 4 ' After citing other cases, the court offered
the following test for the enforceability of contracts in restraint of trade:
These cases fully justify the conclusion, that a contract in restraint of
trade can only be enforced, when it is made to appear from the pleadings
and proofs: 1. That the restraint is partial; 2. That it is founded upon a
valuable consideration; and 3. That it is reasonable and not oppressive.4 2
In addressing how reasonableness should be evaluated, the court quoted the
Homer v. Graves formulation 43 that the reasonableness of a restraint will be
evaluated by reference to whether it is larger than that necessary to protect the
interests of the contracting party."
Applying these criteria, the court concluded that the covenant was enforceable
only with respect to the promise to refrain from engaging in a competitive
business in Hamilton County. To the extent it prohibited Lange from engaging
in a competitive business anywhere in the United States, the court held that the
covenant was "clearly illegal and void". 45 Although the court did not expressly
say so, the country-wide restraint was apparently unenforceable because it was a
"general restraint", falling in the same category as the England-wide restraint
condemned by Chief Justice Parker in Mitchel v. Reynolds in text quoted earlier
in the opinion.46
The court confronted a similar issue the next year in Thomas v. Administrator
of Miles. 47 Thomas and Miles had been partners in the business of dealing in
"fancy goods, cabinet-maker's trimmings and furnishings, and patent medicines"
in Cincinnati. 4 ' They dissolved the partnership, and Miles sold his interest to
Thomas subject to a covenant that he, Miles, would not enter into competition
with Thomas for a period of five years in Cincinnati or anywhere else that

41Id.
42

at 528.

id.

43See supra note 11 and accompanying text

"2 Ohio St. at 530.
4-id. at 531.

"Id. at 527.
473 Ohio St. 275 (1854).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
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Miles allegedly breached the

The court had little difficulty in holding that the covenant was reasonable and
enforceable to the extent it restrained Miles from engaging in competition in
Cincinnati:
Tested by the general principles applicable to contracts of this character,
as settled by this court in Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519, this agreement
seems to have been reasonable and proper, and founded upon a sufficient
consideration, so far as it restrained Miles from engaging, for a limited
time, within the city of Cincinnati, in the business theretofore pursued by
the firm, and which it may fairly be inferred was expected to be
continued by Thomas.
So far it is only a partial restraint of trade, no more extensive than was
necessary to afford a fair protection to the purchaser of the whole partnership interest; while the influence it might have upon the value of that
interest, and the inducement it furnished to bid higher for it, would seem
50
to furnish a sufficient pecuniary consideration to uphold the contract.
To the extent the covenant also restricted Miles from engaging in business in
any locale outside of Cincinnati where Thomas might establish a branch or
agency, the court held that the covenant was "in general restraint of trade,
opposed to public policy, and therefore void". 51 Because, however, the covenant
was divisible, the court held that it could be enforced to the extent that it was
limited to Cincinnati.
The court considered in Grasselli v. Lowden52 whether a covenant ancillary
to the settlement of a nuisance action was enforceable. Lowden had filed a
nuisance action against Grasselli in the superior court in Cincinnati to enjoin
Grasselli's operation of a laboratory on his property. The case was settled on July
10, 1851. In return for Lowden dismissing the action, Grasselli was not to
conduct any business at the laboratory beginning five years from the date of the
49

1d. at 276.
50 Id. at 276.
Id. at 277. Although the court had no evidence before it to suggest that Thomas, as the covenantee,
may have had a legitimate interest in preventing Miles from engaging in business where Thomas might
set up a branch or agency, it is not difficult to envision interest that would have made this feature of the
restraint reasonable. If, for example, Miles had been aware of confidential information about Thomas'
business, the restraint may have been necessary to protect Thomas against Miles' use of it in direct
competition. See infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text for judicial recognition of trade secrets and
other confidential information as protectable interests in the enforcement of restrictive employment
covenants.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
10
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agreement.53 Grasselli breached the covenant by continuing, after July 10, 1856,
to manufacture sulfuric acid in the laboratory. Lowden filed an action for breach
of the covenant and sought liquidated damages, as provided in the agreement. 54
Grasselli urged that the contract could not be enforced because it was in
restraint of trade. The court had no problem enforcing the covenant:
. . . [T]he contract, tested by the rules applicable to agreements in
restraint of trade, is one which the law must still enforce. These rules are
said to be -- 1. The restraint must be partial only. 2. It must be founded
upon a valuable consideration; and 3. It must be reasonable, and not
oppressive.55
The court applied these three criteria, holding, first, that the restraint was partial,
limited to one lot in the City of Cincinnati. It held, second,
that it was founded
56
lawsuit.
a
of
settlement
the
consideration,
valuable
upon
Third, the court held that the restraint was reasonable. It noted that the
reasonableness of the restraint is not to be tested by "reference to its effect upon
the rights and interests of the covenantor" but rather by its effects on the rights
of the covenantee and the rights and interests of the public. 57 The court then
quoted the definition of reasonableness offered in Homer v. Graves, already set
out above.58
In evaluating whether the restraint affected the public interest, the court
observed that Grasselli was free to continue his business in any other portion of
the city or surrounding country. The restraint therefore could not be condemned
"as contravening public policy". 59 As to whether the restraint was no greater
than the interests of Lowden required, the court likewise found it reasonable.
Because the restraint agreed to by Grasselli was even less onerous than the
remedy Lowden could have obtained by way of injunction if he had succeeded
in the nuisance action, the court had no difficulty in concluding that the restraint
was not greater than that consistent with Lowden's interests. 60

-1

Id. at 350.

u Id. at 351.
"I d. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
IId. at 357.
Id. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for the full quote.
11 Ohio St. 349, 358 (1860).
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The Ohio Supreme Court next addressed the enforceability of a contract in
restraint of trade in Stines v. Dorman.61 Dorman purchased in March 1873 from
Blakley the Tremont House hotel in Conneaut. Dorman sold Blakley, in partial
payment for the Tremont House, a building previously used as a hotel under the
name Randolph House. Blakley promised that he would not use the former
Randolph House for a hotel or inn as long as the Tremont House was used for
that purpose. Blakley thereafter sold the building, and it was eventually transferred to Stines, who opened it as a hotel. Dorman thereupon brought an action
to enforce the restrictive covenant.62
After holding that Dorman could enforce the covenant against Stines as an
assignee of the original party to the covenant, Blakley, the court considered
whether the restriction was void because in restraint of trade. The contention did
not long detain the court:
This claim can not avail. It is not a contract in general restraint of trade,
but is limited in its application to a specific parcel of real property, and
forbids its use to a particular business.
The consideration is sufficient, for the restriction formed a material
part of the consideration by which the property was obtained, and, under
the circumstances, must be regarded as reasonable and not oppressive. 63
e
The court considered in Morgan v. Perhamus
whether a restrictive
covenant incident to the sale of a millinery and dress-making business was
enforceable. As part of the sale of the business and its goodwill, the seller agreed
that she would not at any time in the future engage in the same business in the
town of Felicity, Ohio, or at any other place near enough to Felicity to interfere
with the conduct of the business by its purchasers.65 The court's analysis
focused on whether the goodwill of the business constituted part of the seller's
separate estate or instead could only have been transferred if her husband had
joined in the sale, and it had no problem holding, without analysis, that the
covenant was proper

And it is not doubted that, had she been sole and unmarried when the
contract was entered into, the stipulation not to re-engage in the business

61

25 Ohio St. 580 (1874).

62 Id.
'"

at 581.

Id. at 583.
36 Ohio St. 517 (1881).

65Id. at 518.
"Id. at 521-22.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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in the town of Felicity, or so near thereto as to interfere with the
business, would have been perfectly valid. Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St.
519.61
The Ohio Supreme Court had occasion in 1898 in Lufkin Rule Co. v.
Fringeli 8 to recapitulate the law of contracts in restraint of trade and apply it
to a comparatively new phenomenon, the monopoly.
The Fringeli brothers had been engaged in Cleveland in the business of
manufacturing and selling rules and other instruments used primarily in measuring
lumber.69 Lufkin Rule Company, with its principal office in Saginaw, Michigan,
purchased the entire business and assets of the Fringeli's and secured a promise
from the sellers that they would not engage in the same business in the State of
Ohio or anywhere else in the United States for a period of 25 years. 7' The
Fringeli's thereafter breached the agreement by opening a new business, the
then sought liquidated damages for
Cleveland Rule Company. Lufkin Rule
7
breach of the noncompetition covenant. '
After observing that agreements in general restraint of trade are void, the
court noted that partial restraints may be enforceable:
[Aigreements that only impose a partial restraint, made in connection
with the purchase of a business, that are reasonably necessary to make
available the good will purchased with the business, and are reasonable,
and not oppressive, may be enforced.' 2
It then considered whether the restraint before it was an enforceable partial
restraint.
The court observed that the case of Lange v. Werk "is the leading one on the
subject" of the enforceability of contracts in restraint of trade.' 3 The court
discussed the facts of the earlier case and restated its test for enforceability. It
noted, as well, that there is a presumption that any such contract is unenforceable
and that the party seeking to enforce it must overcome the presumption:

67Jd.
6

at 521.

57 Ohio St. 596, 49 N.E. 1030 (1898).

' Id. at 597, 49 N.E. at 1032.
70 Id. at 598, 49 N.E. at 1032.
71
7

d. at 601, 49 N.E. at 1032.
Id.

73Id.
Published
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The presumption of illegality [i.e., unenforceability] arises from the fact
that any restraint of the kind tends to oppression, by depriving the
individual of the right to engage in a pursuit or trade with which he is
generally most familiar, and consequently the community of the services
of a skillful laborer, and the general effect must be, more or less, to
encourage idleness, and affect the price of such things as had been
produced by his labor. These are the general reasons against any restraint
of trade, and, being founded in the nature of things, cannot be materially
varied by any change in the times and circumstances of a people.74
Because the restraint before it covered, at a minimum, all of Ohio, the court
had no difficulty concluding that it was a general restraint and therefore
unenforceable. It distinguished Thomas v. Administratorof Miles and Morgan v.
Perhamus, discussed above, 75 as cases in which partial restraints were enforced.76 The court explained why the restriction in the latter case, preventing
the seller of the business from engaging in the same business in Felicity, Ohio,
was reasonable:
The good will being in general nothing more than the probability that the
old customers will resort to the old place for the purpose of trade, it is
apparent that in this case the restraint imposed was reasonable, being no
more than was required to secure the good will of the business to the purchaser, and was not oppressive, as she was at liberty to carry on the same
business outside of the limits to which the good will of her former
business, carried on in Felicity, extended. Partial restraints on trade, of
this character, have been generally sustained, and they are the only ones
that have been, in this state or elsewhere, unless it be in a few modem
instances, to which we will hereafter refer.77
The court then discussed the comparatively recent decision by the New York
Court of Appeals in Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber.78 There, Roeber had sold
his business and goodwill and promised that he would not for a period of 99
years thereafter engage anywhere in the United States, except Nevada and

74 Id.

The presumption of invalidity was well-established. See 1 E. KiNTNER, supra note 12, at § 2.5;

Kerr, supra note 13, at 884-85. It has been repeated from time to time in later decisions. See, e.g., MidWest Presort Mailing Servs., Inc. v. Clark, No. 13215, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1988) (1988
WL 17825 (Ohio App.)) ("[n]oncompetition clauses ae to be strictly construed in favor of freedom of
competition"); Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ohio C.P.
1952). At most, the presumption has the effect of imposing on a plaintiff the burden of showing
reasonableness.
75 See supra notes 47-51 and 64-67 and accompanying text.

"57 Ohio St. at 604-05, 49 N.E. at 1032-33.
at 606, 49 N.E. at 1033.
"Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
"106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
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Montana, in a business competitive with that of the buyer, the manufacture and
sale of friction matches. 79 Diamond Match had successfully enforced the
covenant against Roeber. 80 The Ohio Supreme Court, obviously not in agreement with the holding of the New York Court of Appeals, ventured an explanation for it:
In this case, and in those similar to it, the question seems to be considered as one wholly between the parties; and if the restraint is no more
than the purchaser requires as a protection to the enjoyment of what he
purchased, and for which the vendor received a fair consideration, then

it is argued that there is no objection to the contract, because the limits
of trade and commerce are now so great, under modem conditions, that

a general restraint is not more than is reasonable to afford protection to
the purchaser in his business."
The court rejected this reasoning as "fallacious" because "it ignores the
interest of the public".82 Noting that Congress and a number of states had
enacted statutes declaring monopolies and restraints of trade unlawful, the court
reasoned that private contract law could not be used to immunize general
restraints of trade injurious to the public welfare:
Therefore, contracts whereby men are purchased out of their business, and
restrained from carrying it on anywhere else, should receive no aid from
the courts. No more efficient method could be devised for the creation
of the monopoly in any business. . . . To say in such cases that the
vendor should be bound not to carry on his business, because he has
received an adequate consideration for his agreement, is no answer to the
objection that the agreement tends to foster the formation of a monopoly,
and is therefore against public policy.83

at 477-78, 13 N.E. at 419.
so Id. at 486, 13 N.E. at 423.

7id.

" 57 Ohio St. at 607, 49 N.E. at 1033.
82 Id.
3

'8 d. at 609, 49 N.E. at 1034. The Ohio Supreme Court had earlier voiced the same concern that private
contracts could be used to create a monopoly if a purchaser of businesses secured promises in general
restraint of trade from all the sellers. Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 671-72 (1880).
The court emphasized that contracts in general restraint of trade are "absolutely void", Id. at 671, and
observed that "[clourts will not stop to inquire as to the degree of injury inflicted upon the public; it is
enough to know that the inevitable tendency of such contracts is injurious to the public". Id. at 672.
Justice Stevens, writing for the United States Supreme Court nearly one hundred years later in National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), voiced the same sentiment, observing
that it is no defense under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)) that injury to the public
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
from a restraint may be minimal or that competition itself may not be desirable. Id. at 692, 695, 696.
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The court had noted earlier in the opinion that the holding in DiamondMatch,
approving a nearly nationwide restraint, constituted a departure from "the wellestablished rule of the earlier decisions, notably Mitchel v. Reynolds ... followed
and approved by Ranney, J., in Lange v. Werk"." The court found no justifica-

tion for departing from what it deemed to be long-settled rules of construction,
even in the face of changed economic conditions:
The reasoning of the cases in which a departure from the common law
had been adopted, fails to persuade us that we should disregard the rule
that has been so long settled in this state by the decisions of this court;
on the contrary, the changed conditions, on which the argument proceeds,

interest of a wise public
tend more strongly to convince us that, in the
85
policy, it should be more firmly adhered to.

By the end of the 19th century, the law of ancillary restraints was settled in

Ohio. It can be summed up in a few words. Contracts in restraint of trade were
presumptively unenforceable, and general restraints were absolutely void and
unenforceable. Partial restraints were enforceable to the extent they were
supported by consideration and were reasonable. A restraint would be deemed
to be reasonable if it was no greater than that needed fairly to protect the interests
of the covenantee and not so broad as to interfere with the interests of the public.
IV. The Current State of the Law.
Although the foregoing detailed review of pre-1900 decisions by the Ohio

Supreme Court may seem, at first blush, a purely academic exercise, it is not.
With the exception of a modest gloss on the law of employee noncompetition

Ohio St. at 606-07, 49 N.E. 1033. It is not at all clear from the court's opinion what it meant by the
"well-established rule" of the earlier cases. If the "rule" was that general restraints are void, then
Diamond Match was no departure, because the New York Court of Appeals expressly held that the
restriction before it was partial, not general. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 484-85, 13
N.E. 419, 423 (1887). if it meant that a country-wide restraint would be void, the New York court had
been careful to note that the restraint before it did not cover the entire country but instead expressly
exempted Nevada and Montana. Id. If it meant that a state-wide restraint would be void as a general
restraint, that "rule" was not even addressed in either Mitchel v. Reynolds or Lange v. Werk. If it meant
that it had been the rule at common law that courts should evaluate the public interest before enforcing
a contract in restraint of trade, the New York decision was no departure, because the court had specifically
considered the limited foreclosure of commerce that would result. Id. In fact, the New York decision did
not constitute a radical departure from common law rules on enforceability of restrictive covenants, and
the Ohio Supreme Court's characterization of it as such reflects more passion than analysis.
Even if the court had based its disapproval of Diamond Match on the ground that all country-wide
restraints were unreasonable at common law, it would have been mistaken on that ground as well. See
Eaton, supra note 12, at 134-36. See also infra note 148.
8457

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
s557 Ohio St. at 609-10, 49 N.E. at 1034.
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covenantsg and the court's holding in Raimonde v. Van VierahY that contracts
in restraint of trade may be reformed and enforced to the extent reasonable, the
Ohio Supreme Court has not materially departed from or added to its ancillary
restraint analysis in the last 90 years. The nineteenth-century case law has not

been supplanted.
Despite limited guidance from the Ohio Supreme Court on the subject of
ancillary restraints, lower courts have repeatedly spoken on a multitude of issues
left unaddressed by the Supreme Court. We will review some of these lower
court decisions as they apply to three major categories of ancillary restraints: (1)
restrictive covenants incident to the sale of a business; (2) restrictive covenants
incident to the leasing of real or personal property; and (3) restrictive covenants
incident to employment relationships."8 This will be followed by a review of
other categories of ancillary restraints, including those incident to franchising.

This review of the case law will show that the courts have remained sensitive
to competition analysis 89 in evaluating restraints, balancing the competitive

"See the discussion of Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 565 N.E.2d 540 (1991), at
notes 234-39 infra and accompanying text; Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544
(1975), at notes 230-33 infra and accompanying text; Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St.
403,200 N.E.2d 297 (1964), at notes 224-29 infra and accompanying text; and Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio
St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942), at notes 216-23 infra and accompanying text.
'7 42 Ohio St.2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).
" A threshold issue in every restrictive covenant case is whether the law of Ohio governs the parties'
agreement. Where the parties are not both in Ohio, where the contract is not to be performed entirely in
Ohio or where other features of the contract implicate the interests of other states, resolution of the
conflict of laws may prove troublesome. This difficulty can be averted, in part, by the inclusion of a
choice-of-law clause specifying Ohio law. It is the policy of the Ohio courts to give effect to the parties'
choice of law. See, e.g., Schulke Radio Prods., Ltd. v. Midwestern Broadcasting Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 436,
438-39, 453 N.E.2d 683, 686 (1983). Whether an Ohio choice-of-law clause will be enforced in a forum
outside Ohio depends upon the conflicts of law policy of the forum state. Ohio choice-of-law clauses
have been given effect in some cases outside Ohio, see, e.g., Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674 F.2d 1371,
1374-75 (11th Cir. 1982) (Ohio law not contrary to fundamental policy of Georgia on enforcement of
noncompetition covenants); Barnes Group, Inc. v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454. 459 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
(public policy interests of Indiana do not outweigh parties' choice of Ohio law), but not in others, see,
e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1030-32 (4th Cir. 1983) (Ohio law
conflicts with fundamental policy of Alabama on enforceability of employee noncompetition covenants).
Whether to follow the parties' choice-of-law clause in enforcing noncompetition covenants can sometimes
pose daunting analytical difficulties. See, e.g., Scott v. Snelling & SneUing, Inc., 732 F.Supp. 1034, 103941 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (Cal. law applied instead of parties' choice of Pa. law); DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677-79 (Tex. 1990) (fex.law applied instead of parties' choice of Fla. law), cert.
denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1991).
89 As Professor Hovenkamp has demonstrated, however, competition as we understand it was not a factor
in evaluating the reasonableness of restraints at common law. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 1030-41.
It was not until Judge Taft's opinion in Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., at the earliest, that the enforceability
of ancillary restraints was evaluated by reference to competition, i.e., the condition existing when
producers are making independent decisions about output and pricing, the necessary effect of which is
to keep prices lower than they might otherwise be in a market affected by collusion. Id. at 1025-27,
1040-44. As Justice Holmes attempted to explain in his dissent in Northern Secs. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 403 (1904), even if Section 1 of the Sherman Act were, to take its content from the
Published
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benefits of a restraint against its anti-competitive effects and taking into account,
at the same time, the specific features of the restrictive covenant before them,
such as the hardship enforcement may cause an employee.
A.

Restrictive Covenants Incident to the Sale of a Business.

Judge Taft explained in Addyston Pipe & Steel" that a promise by the
seller of a business not to compete with the buyer finds its justification in the
need to secure to the buyer the enjoyment of the goodwill of the business. 91
Chief Justice Parker recognized this justification in Mitchel v. Reynolds 2 in
holding that the promise by the baker not to engage for a period of five years in
competition with the purchaser of his business was enforceable. He reduced the
matter very simply to whether the seller or the purchaser "shall have the trade in
this neighborhood"9 3 and observed that the public interest is not adversely
affected by such a covenant: "the concern of the public is equal on both
sides".'
The Ohio cases proceed on the same principle. Citing Lange v. Werk,95
the Ohio Supreme Court commented in Lufkin Rule,96 as already discussed
above,97 that restrictive covenants incident to the sale of a business may be
enforced if they meet these criteria:
[A]greements that only impose a partial restraint, made in
connection with the purchase of a business, that are reasonably
necessary to make available the good will purchased with the
business, and are reasonable, and not oppressive, may be
enforced. 98
The protectable interest of the covenantee is the goodwill purchased from the
covenantor.

according to Holmes, a restraint of trade was, fundamentally, nothing more than a voluntarily-imposed
restriction on one's freedom of contract ]a. at 404. Its reasonableness did not depend upon its effect
upon competition. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 1032-34, 1039-44.
" United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
9'Id.
921

at 281.

P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).

93Id.

at 197, 24 Eng. Rep. at 352.

94Id.
2 Ohio St. 520 (1853)
Lufldn Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St. 596, 49 N.E. 1030 (1898).
97See supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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It is settled that such a promise in restraint of trade is appropriate in the
99
sale of any business in which goodwill forms a part of the assets acquired.
Unlike restrictive covenants incident to employment relationships, in which the
need for protection of the covenantee is often subject to extended debate," °
there has never been any serious question about the propriety of such a covenant
in connection with the sale of an on-going business.1"' The explanation is not
difficult to find. Competition between the seller and purchaser is, concededly,
restrained, but the restraint is essential if the purchaser is to retain the value of the
business and its goodwill. Without this restraint, the purchaser faces the risk of
unfair competition from the former owner. The ability of the purchaser to
compete against others is strengthened by the restraint, and the buying public
correspondingly benefits from the increased competition. Although not articulated
in the cases, justification for the restraint can be found in conventional rule of
reason analysis: The restraint on the seller's ability to compete is offset by the
benefit to competition in the market for the business' goods or services."°
Geographic Scope. Because the need to protect the business' goodwill
is never in dispute, the reasonableness of these covenants has tended to turn
exclusively on their duration and geographic extent. In evaluating geographic
extent, the courts have looked to see whether the restraint is "no more extensive
0 3 Where the
than was necessary to afford a fair protection to the purchaser".
seller's business had been confined to Cincinnati, for example, it was entirely
reasonable to enforce a covenant that prohibited the seller from engaging in
business in Cincinnati for a period of five years from the sale. 1°4 To the extent,
however, that the restraint reached beyond this, and prohibited the seller from
engaging in business in another city where the purchaser might also set up his
trade, it was unreasonable and unenforceable.'0 5

" Indeed, even in the absence of such a promise, the Ohio courts will imply a promise on the part of the
seller not to solicit the customers of his former business in competition with the buyer, thereby impairing
the goodwill purchased by the buyer. See Suburban Ice Mfg. & Cold Storage Co. v. Mulvihill, 21 Ohio
App. 438, 442, 153 N.E. 204, 205 (1926). See generally Note, Sale of a Business -- Restraints on the
Vendor's Right to Compete, 13 W. RFs. L REV. 161, 165-67 (1961).
10 See infra notes 241-66 and accompanying text.
10' It has been held, however, that it would be unreasonable to enforce a covenant absolutely preventing
a vendor from later engaging in the same business as the vendee where the "work is of a menial
character", i.e., window washing, and it was the vendor's only means of earning a livelihood. Queen City
Cleaning Co. v. Davis, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 474, 476 (Ct. App. 1916).
102 See infra note 186 for a discussion of rule of reason analysis applicable to vertical restraints under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
'0 3 Thomas v. Administrator of Miles, 3 Ohio St. 275, 276 (1854). For a review of the early cases on the
reasonableness of the geographic scope of the restriction, see generally Kales, Contracts to Refrainfrom
Doing Business orfrom Entering or Carrying on an Occupation, 31 HARV. L. REv. 193, 197-206 (1917).
'0* Thomas v. Administrator of Miles, 3 Ohio St. 275, 276 (1854).

LW Id. at 276-77.
Published
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The Ohio Supreme Court emphasized in Luflin Rule that the reasonableness of a restraint depends in large measure upon whether it is co-extensive with
the geographic boundaries of the seller's business. In explaining the restraint in
another case," ° the Lufkin Rule court described the need for this limitation:
The good will being in general nothing more than the probability
that the old customers will resort to the old place for the purpose
of trade, it is apparent that in this case the restraint imposed was
reasonable, being no more than was required to secure the good
will of the business to the purchaser, and was not oppressive, as
she was at liberty to carry on the same business outside of the
limits to which the good will of her former business, carried on
in Felicity, extended.'0 7
The seller's scope of business is not in every case determinative, however.
Noting, correctly, that "such contracts are for the protection of the vendee", the
court held in ParagonOil Co. v. Hall"°8 that the covenant was not unreasonable
even though it extended beyond the geographic scope of the seller's business.
The seller's business had been confined to Xenia, but the purchaser was engaged
in the business of selling and delivering oil and gasoline throughout the State of
Ohio, excepting Cleveland.1°9 In the sale of his business to the plaintiff, defendant agreed to refrain from engaging in the business of selling and delivering oil
and gasoline throughout the State of Ohio outside of Cleveland.'
The court
encountered no difficulty in holding that this restriction was reasonable, because
it was necessary for the protection of the purchaser:
It thus appears that the only restraint placed by the contract upon
defendant was that he should not engage in the business within
the territory where the plaintiff was conducting its business. That
it considered it necessary to make this stipulation to protect the
business which it had established and was carrying on, and
intended to carry on, is obvious; and that it was not an unreasonable requirement, seems to us equally clear."'

'06 Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517 (1881).

This case is discussed at supra notes 64-67 and

accompanying text.
'07Lulkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St. 596, 605, 49 N.E. 1030, 1033 (1898).
"' 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 576 (Ct. App. 1893).
'09 Id. at 579.
,"0 Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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The Ohio Supreme Court's refusal in Luflkin Rule" 2 to approve a
nationwide restriction such as that approved by the New York Court of Appeals
in Diamond Match" 3 has not been followed in later cases." 4 The court
emphasized in Lufkin Rule that it was no defense to a general restraint to argue
that the nationwide extent was necessary to give protection to the purchaser's
legitimate interests." 5 The defense must give way, the court reasoned, to the
public interest in a market free of monopoly. Other courts have not found this
reasoning persuasive.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in
Prame v. Ferrell"6 that Diamond Match was perfectly good authority for the
proposition that a nationwide restraint should be enforced. In ruling on an appeal
from the federal trial court for the Northern District of Ohio, the court of appeals
ignored Lufkin Rule and other Ohio authorities" 7 and found no difficulty in
enforcing a covenant coextensive with the continental United States:
By the sale of appellant's interest no monopoly was created. The
competition in the sale of grain separators and cleaners then was,
and always since has been, active and substantial. No public
interest will thus be violated by imposing the restraint demanded.
In our opinion, the covenant of restraint, as so construed by us,
was entirely reasonable, taking into account the circumstances
and situation of the parties and the business involved." 8
The court emphasized that enforcement of the covenant was necessary to protect
the goodwill of the business from interference at the hands of the seller." 9

.12
Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St. 596, 609, 49 N.E. 1030, 1033 (1898).
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887). See supra notes 78-85 and
accompanying text.
114The view that such a general restraint is absolutely void has been volunteered as dictum, however.
11

The court commented in Ehrhardt v. Hamilton Fan & Blower Co., No. C-850265, slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct
App. Mar. 19, 1986) (1986 WL 3423 (Ohio App.)), that a noncompetition promise extending throughout
the entire United States would be "unenforceable on its face", citing Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringefi, 57 Ohio
St. 596, 49 N.E. 1030 (1898).
"
16

57 Ohio St. at 607, 49 N.E. at 1033.
166 F. 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 605 (1909).

" 7 This is a decision antedating, obviously, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The federal court
was under no duty to follow the substantive law of the forum state.
IS 166 F. at 705.
"Id.

at 705-06. Likewise, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced a noncompet-

ition covenant unlimited as to time or geography by confining its reach to the United States. Hall Mfg.
Co. v. Western Steel & Iron Works, 227 F. 588, 593 (1915). Unless the covenant were enforced at least
to this extent, the vendor would be able, the court observed, to "sell property, retain the proceeds, and
Published
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Without holding that a nationwide restraint was reasonable, an intermediate Ohio appellate court recognized, in common with the Sixth Circuit in
Prame v. Ferrell, that the Diamond Match holding may be justifiable under
In Kex Manufacturing Co. v. Plu-Gum Co. 120 the
certain circumstances.
purchaser of a tire repair business secured from the seller a promise not to reenter the business anywhere within the United States. The restraint was held by
the court of appeals for Cuyahoga County to be void and unenforceable.
The buyer urged unsuccessfully that the restriction was appropriate
because it, the buyer, was engaged in the business of tire repairs outside the State
of Ohio. The court turned aside the suggestion, finding, instead, that the tire
repair business was local and holding that any restraint on the seller could be
justified only if it were also local. 12' The court acknowledged, however, that
DiamondMatch was good authority for imposition of a nationwide restraint under
the proper circumstances:
So necessarily the repairing of tires must be a local business, and,
with that in mind, in analyzing this contract, one will see how
broad and wide it is, and I know of no contract that has been
sustained under circumstances such as these. The Diamond
Match Co. v. Roeber Case... is authority for the proposition
that a contract will be sustained where it covers practically the
whole United States. But that is not this kind of a case. There
are cases which cover a large part of the United States, but those
are different than the case at bar. In other words, the contracts
have been sustained when it was necessary to do so to preserve
the business which was sold, and, if that covered a broader area
than a local trade, a contract for that purpose for a reasonable
time would be upheld, but no contract has been upheld where it
is for all time, or where the time is so unreasonably long that it
would necessarily forever prohibit the vendor from engaging in
a like business.
We think, from all the authorities, that this
contract was
22
absolutely void as being against public policy.
In common with the holding in Kex Manufacturing,the Ohio courts have
routinely enforced noncompetition covenants incident to the sale of business

'2

162 N.E. 816 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928).

121Id.

at 817.

12 Id.
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where the restriction has extended no farther than a specific metropolitan
area. 23
It should be no surprise that the Ohio Supreme Court's disapproval of
nationwide restraints in Lufkin Rule has been all but ignored. The court's concern
with a restraint of this scope was fundamentally a concern with interstate
commerce. The Sherman Act and the federal merger law, enacted in 1914 as the
Clayton ActIU directly address restraints of trade in interstate commerce and,
as a practical matter, remove them from the scope of state law. A nationwide
restrictive covenant may restrain or tend substantially to lessen competition within
a relevant market and thereby violate Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act 125 or
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.'26 Concededly, interstate restraints may be a
subject of the ancillary restraint doctrine -- and evaluating impact on competition
is one of the steps in ancillary restraint analysis 127 -- but interstate market
foreclosure and economic impact
have become virtually the exclusive province
28
of the federal antitrust laws.
Duration. The duration of a restraint has received considerably less
attention as a criterion of reasonableness. Indeed, it would be fair to say that the
Ohio courts have not analyzed the matter in the least. They have approved,
31
without discussion, covenants of six months, 129 five years, 13° ten years'

"aE.g., DiAngelo v. Pucci, No. 1267, slip op. at 2 (Ohio CL App. Mar. 31, 1987) (1987 WL 8856 (Ohio
App.)) (10-mile radius of the City of Ashtabula); Barnett v. Gloger, 8 Ohio L Abs. 75, 76 (Ct. App.
1929) (Toledo); Ewing v. Davis, 15 Ohio Cir. Dec. 203, 208 (Cir. Ct. 1903) (City of Kent and Portage
Cty.); Kevil v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 311, 313 (Super. Ct. 1901) (Covington, Ky.); Empson v.
Bissinger, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 629, 630 (C.P. 1883) (Cincinnati).
' Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
12515 U.S.C §§ 1, 2 (1982).
',

15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).

As the analysis in Prame v. Ferrell, 166 F. 702, 705 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 605 (1909),
discussed at supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text, shows, the courts had the ability in applying
ancillary restraint analysis to evaluate market and economic impact with some refinement.
'2

'" Market foreclosure and economic impact have not received comparable attention under the ancillary
restraint doctrine, and courts have approved multi-state restrictive covenants even in the face of
demonstrable anti-competitive effects, as the holding in Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473,
13 N.E. 419 (1887). reflects. As one respected commentator has recently noted. "Itihe widespread use
of covenants not to compete in cases involving asset acquisitions suggests that many of the great mergers
of the turn of the century were anticompetitive". Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the
Theory of the Firm:An HistoricalPerspective, 59 ANTIrTRUST L. 75, 83 (1990).
129 Stephens v. Pahl, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 377, 378-379 (Super. Ct. 1921).
'30Thomas v. Administrator of Miles, 3 Ohio St. 275, 276 (1854); Bukontz v. Moskowitz, 2 Ohio L Abs.
299 (Ct. App. 1924); Paragon Oil Co. v. Hall, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 576, 579 (Ct. App. 1893); Empson v.
Bissinger, 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 629, 630-31 (C.P. 1883).

31J.D. Nichols Stores, Inc. v. Lipschutz, 120 Ohio App. 286, 293, 201 N.E.2d 898, 903 (1963); Barnett
1929); Queen City Cleaning Co. v. Davis, 27 Ohio Cir. Dec.
474, 475 (Ct. App. 1916).
v. Gloger, by
8 Ohio
L. Abs. 75, 76 (Ct.1991
App.
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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and fifteen years. 32 Beyond this, one can find decisions in which the restraint
has no fixed duration other than the life of the vendee's business. As long as the
vendee continues in the business acquired from the
covenantor, the covenant not
33
to engage in competition is deemed reasonable.
If one looks for an explanation for this judicial indifference, it may
perhaps be found in cases such as the Sixth Circuit's decision in Prame v.
Ferrell." In approving nationwide enforcement of a covenant, 35 the court
considered it of no consequence that the covenant was of unlimited duration. It
simply took the view that duration was a matter of no consequence:
It is conceded that under the authorities a covenant so limited as
to territory may be valid, notwithstanding the lack of limit as to
36
time.
There is no basis for removing duration from the reasonableness equation.
Any discriminating analysis of whether a restraint is only as broad as needed to
protect the legitimate interests of the purchaser will necessarily take it into
37
The general formulations of the ancillary restraint doctrine1
account.
repeatedly identify duration as a criterion of reasonableness. The Restatement
(Second) of Contractsaffords slightly more guidance in applying this criterion by
observing that
if the restraint is to last longer than is required in light of those
interests [i.e., the legitimate interests of the purchaser], taking
account of such factors as the permanent or transitory
nature of
38
unreasonable.
is
it
information,
and
technology

'32

DiAngelo v. Pucci, No. 1267, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. March 31, 1987) (1987 WL 8856 (Ohio

App.)).
133 Morgan v. Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517, 518, 521 (1881); Ewing v. Davis, 15 Ohio Cir. Dec. 203, 20506, 208 (Ct App 1903); Anderson v. Joyce, 16 Ohio Dec. 320, 325 (C.P. 1905); Kevil v. Standard Oil

Co., 8 Ohio N.P. 311, 313 (Super. Ct. 1901).
34

166 F. 702 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 605 (1909).

'" See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
166 F. at 705. The New York Court of Appeals had earlier made the same observation - that
unlimited duration was of no significance if the restraint was otherwise enforceable -- in Diamond Match
Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 484, 13 N.E. 419, 423 (1887). One contemporary commentator observed
that it was "commonly understood" that unlimited duration would not render a covenant invalid, but
unlimited geographic scope would. Eaton, supra note 12, at 128.
"3

'37

See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
'3$ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAS § 188, comment

d (1981).
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The Restatement formulation of the ancillary restraint doctrine has been cited by
at least one Ohio court 39 and it has been approved by courts in other jurisdictions."
One measure of the reasonableness of duration is whether the length of
the restriction is adequate to permit the creation by the buyer of goodwill
As Professor Corbin has put it, the
independent from that of the seller. 41
restraint should continue
only as long as the personal business and customer relationships
of the seller are still such that his re-entry into the business will
draw business from the buyer by reason of their continuance.
The seller's promise should never bind him after his re-entry into
the business would affect the buyer's business no more than
would his entry as a stranger. At that point, doubts as to which
may properly be resolved in favor of the buyer, the public
interest in free competition should control. 4 2
ContinuingAuthority of Lufkin Rule. The nearly total absence, for several
decades, of any case law on the enforceability of restrictive covenants incident to
the sale of a business speaks eloquently for the settled state of Ohio law: a
restraint is ancillary and reasonable if it is no greater than needed to protect the
legitimate interests of the 143
vendee. The test emerges clearly from the decisions of
the Ohio Supreme Court.
The fact remains, however, that Lufkin Rule raises a serious and
continuing obstacle to the enforceability of any such covenants of broad
geographic scope. The Ohio Supreme Court's holding that a nationwide
restriction -- considered a "general" restraint -- was unreasonable because contrary
to the public interest stands undisturbed. Although it may be predicted with some
'" Ehrhardt v. Hamilton Fan & Blower Co., No. C-850265, slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. March 19, 1986)
(1986 WL 3423 (Ohio App.)).
" See, e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681-83 (rex. 1990) (Tex. law), cert. denied,
59 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1991). It has been the subject of well-founded criticism on a number
grounds, however. See generally Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts. 57 N.Y.U.L.REV. 669 (1982).
"'t See, e.g., Verson Wilkins, Ltd. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 723 F.Supp. 1, 11 (N.D. Ill. 1989)UII. law).
6A A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1391 at 79. See also Kerr, supra note 13, at 881-82; Note, Validity
and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants Not to Compete, 16 W. RES. L REV. 161, 183-85 (1964);
Note, supra note 99, at 176.
13 See supra notes 39-85 and accompanying text. The legality of restrictive covenants ancillary to the
'4

sale of a business has repeatedly been reviewed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)), as well. The analysis closely follows that of the ancillary restraint doctrine generally, with the
additional Section 1 requirements for proof of market definition and impact on interstate commerce. See,
e.g., Lektro-Vend
Corp. v. Vendo Co.,
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991660 F.2d 255, 265-69 (7th Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982); Verson Wilkins Ltd. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 723 F.Supp. 1, 7-15 (N.D. Ill. 1989).

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 1
AK ON LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 24:3

confidence that, if the issue were presented today to the Ohio Supreme Court, it
would decide it differently, siding now with the New York Court of Appeals'
analysis in Diamond Match, and even though the decision can be dismissed as a
product of the antitrust populism of the 1890's,'44 the holding is controlling on
the lower Ohio courts as well as federal courts sitting in diversity. 4 5
Under Raimonde v. Van Vlerah,' discussed below,1 47 such a restraint
may be enforced to the extent reasonable, but Lufkin Rule may foreclose the

conclusion that a nationwide, or greater, restraint can ever be reasonable. The
proposition is facially absurd in view of modem commercial practices and the
international dimensions of many markets, but the case has yet to be repudiated
by the court that wrote it.'4
Having reviewed the ancillary restraint doctrine as it applies to the sale
of a business, 1 49 let us turn now to another setting in which restrictive covenants

are routinely negotiated--leases.
144See H. THORELU, supra note 5, at 311-43, 352-58; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the

Formative Era: The Constitutionaland Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 495, 504-07 (1987).
'43A federal court applying Ohio law would be bound to follow Lufkin Rule even though it could
prognosticate a different holding by the Ohio Supreme Court if the case were to be decided today. See
generally 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 at 91-92
(1982). Lufkin Rule could be ignored only if the federal court had before it "persuasive data" that the
Ohio Supreme Court would now hold that a nationwide restraint of trade incident to sale of a business
could not constitute an impermissible general restraint. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 851 F.2d 502, 508-09 (1st
Cir. 198g)(federal court declined to deviate from 1869 Vermont Supreme Court holding in absence of
"persuasive data" showing that the court would necessarily now repudiate the holding). There can be no
certainty that a federal court would conclude it could ignore LuJkin Rule or that the Ohio Supreme Court
would abandon it if presented the opportunity.
'4642 Ohio St2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).

4 See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
" The distinction between general and partial restraints had been repudiated even by the English courts
by the time Lukin Rule was decided. To the extent the Ohio Supreme Court purported to be following
long-established English precedent in refusing to enforce, or even seriously consider, a "general" restraint,
it was simply wrong. It was able to do so only by ignoring the Ilouse of Lords' decision in Nordenfelt
v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, rejecting the distinction. The Law
Lords there enforced a world-wide noncompetition covenant against the seller of a gun manufacturing
concern, noting that "regard must be had to the changed conditions of commerce and of the means of
communication which have been developed in recent years". Id. at 547. They rejected any further
reliance on the partial-general distinction, emphasizing, instead, that the validity of restraints of trade must
"now ultimately turn upon whether they am reasonable, and whether they exceed what is necessary for
the fair protection of the covenantees". I at 558.
'9 Restrictive covenants incident to the sale of real property may also be enforceable if they satisfy the

criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of a restraint ancillary to the sale of a going business. See, e.g.,
Robey v. Plain City Theatre Co., 126 Ohio St 473, 477-78, 186 N.E. 1,3 (1933). It is no impediment
to their enforcement that no goodwill is transferred in the process. Id. at 477, 186 N.E. at 2. For
examples of cases in which such covenants have survived challenges under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
see, e.g., Drury Inn v. Olive Co., 878 F.2d 340, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1989); Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252, 255-57 (D.N.J. 1975), affd, 533 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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B.

Restrictive Covenants Incident to Leasing.

In listing the range of ancillary restraints at common law, Judge Taft
made no mention in Addyston Pipe & Steel of restrictive covenants incident to

leases.'ts

The use of restrictive covenants in leases is a comparatively recent

development. With few exceptions, the controlling case law dates from the last
three decades, and its emergence can be tied directly to the transformation in
retail trade caused by the appearance of the shopping center, both the strip center
and the mall.' 5'

Lease covenants may protect either a tenant or the landlord. As an
inducement to open a store in a shopping center, a prospective tenant may require
from the lessor a promise that it will not lease within the same center to another
tenant that would offer competitive product lines or otherwise compete with the

Conversely, a
tenant. This is often referred to as an exclusivity clause.'
landlord may require from a major tenant a promise that it will not open another
distance of the shopping center. This is typically referred
store within a certain 53
to as a radius clause.
No Ohio decisions have addressed the enforceability of radius clauses, but
both the state and federal courts applying Ohio law have arrived at a consensus
on the standard for evaluating lease restrictions in favor of tenants. As will be
seen below, that standard is taken from and consistent with the ancillary restraint
doctrine at common law. Under the standard, radius and other restrictive clauses
should be enforceable as long as they are reasonable. They are reasonable where
the competitive benefits secured by the restraint outweigh the anti-competitive

effects of the restraint.

United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898). affd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
'

"' On the development of the shopping center, see generally Baum, Lessors' Covenants Restricting

Competition, 1965 U. 1u. LF. 228, 229-31; Lentzner, Antitrust Implications of Radius Clauses in
Shopping Center Leases, 55 U. Det. J. Urban L. 1, 5-10 (1977); Note. Antitrust Implications of Restrictive

Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 86 HARV. L REV. 1201, 1204-10 (1973).
352 See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Palzes, Inc., 39 Ohio Misc. 155, 156, 317 N.E.2d 262, 263 (C.P.
1974). See generally 3 M. FRIEDMAN, LEAsEs § 28.3 (2d ed. 1983); Baum, supra note 151, at 235-42;

Note, supra note 151, at 1204-05. A tenant may insist upon additional protections as well. The tenant
may secure from the landlord the right to veto prospective tenants. This is typically referred to as an
approval clause. See Note, Texas and Federal Antitrust Iplications of Restrictive Covenants not to
Compete in Shopping Center Leases, 20 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1189, 1190 (1989); Note, supra note 151,

at 1204, 1235-38. Or, the tenant may secure the landlord's promise not to lease to competitors who
engage in discounting. See Note, supra note 151, at 1204, 1208, 1234-35.
" See generally 3 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 152, at § 28.403; Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 140, at
689-95; Lentzner, supra note 151, at 2, Marsh, Federal Antitrust Laws and Radius Clauses in Shopping

Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991(1981).
32 HAST. L.L 839, 840
Center Leases,
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Unlike the sale of a going business, in which goodwill is transferred, the
lease of premises transfers no goodwill. The primary justification for enforcement
of noncompetition covenants incident to the sale of a business -- protection of the
goodwill transferred -- consequently has no role to play in evaluating the
reasonableness of restrictions imposed on a lessee's use of premises'- or on a
landlord leasing to a tenant's competitors. Because the transfer of goodwill is not
a factor in the reasonableness equation, the courts have engaged directly in
competition analysis in reviewing restrictive lease covenants and have enforced
them where the pro-competitive outweigh the anti-competitive effects.
The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that a promise by a lessor not
to lease to a competitor of a tenant is enforceable. The court considered in
Gillen-Crow PharmaciesInc. v. Mandzak155 whether a promise by a lessor not
to sell or lease to a tenant's competitor within one-half mile of the leased
premises was enforceable. In affirming the lower courts' determination that the
covenant was enforceable, the Ohio Supreme Court simply noted in passing that
"[iut is generally accepted that a restrictive covenant in a lease,
which is designed to prevent competitive use of the premises
retained by the covenantor, is enforceable in equity by way of
injunctive relief .... ,,156
The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently discussed directly the enforceability of an exclusive leasing clause. It considered in C. K. & J. K., Inc. v. Fairview
Shopping Center Corp.5 ' the legality of a shopping center lease restriction in
which the lessor promised a tenant that it would not permit any other tenant to
sell alcoholic beverages, other than beer, in the shopping center. The action was
brought by a tenant of Fairview Shopping Center seeking to expand the sale of
alcoholic beverages at its bowling alley in the center -- a use that was prohibited
by the lease restriction between the landlord and another tenant, the Fairview

See Huebner-Toledo Breweries Co. v. Singlar, 18 Ohio Cir. Dec. 329, 332-33 (Ct. App. 1906)
(restriction prohibiting lessee from selling beer at the leased premises, a saloon, other than that produced
by lessor, unenforceable). In the absence of any transfer of goodwill, there is, afortiori,no justification
for implying any noncompetition covenant, and it has been held that a promise of exclusivity in favor of
"4

the lessee will not be implied. Smoke & Spirits, Inc. v. Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co., No. CA 86-07044, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. March 16, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
155 5 Ohio St. 2d 201, 215 N.E.2d 377 (1966).
I"4d. at 205, 215 N.E.2d at 380, quoting Annot., Validity, Construction and Effect of Lessor's Covenant
Against Use of His Other Propertyin Competition with the Lessee-Covenantee, 97 A.L.R.2d 4, 76 (1964).
Without discussing the reasonableness of restrictive covenants or the standard for evaluating reasonableness, lower Ohio courts had earlier enforced exclusivity clauses. See Pyle & Allen Co. v. Hippodrome
Bldg. Co., 23 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 331, 333 (Ct App. 1912); Sheff v. Sleet, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 232, 237-38

(C.P. 1930).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
"" 63 Ohio St2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 507 (1980).
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Lounge."58 After evaluating the legality of the restraint under the Valentine
Act, 59 the court considered whether the restriction violated public policy.
Having already concluded that the restriction did not unreasonably restrain trade
in violation of the Valentine Act, the court had no difficulty concluding that there
was no violation of public policy:
We have already held that the restrictions in leases before us are
reasonable in scope and effect and are necessary in order to
obtain desirable tenants. These restrictions are not void as con6
trary to public polcy.'
It will prove helpful to consider the criteria used by the court to conclude
that the restriction was reasonable. While the court's analysis is thin at best,
certain principles can be discerned. Citing Savon Gas Stations Number Six,
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.,' 61 the court observed that the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit had in that case approved a shopping center lease restriction giving
a gas station the exclusive right to sell gasoline on the tract of land on which the
shopping center was located:
The court determined . . . that the restriction could not be
characterized as imposing an "unreasonable or undue restraint
upon * * * commerce" because the legitimate needs of a
shopping center often required that such restrictions be available."a
The court then cited a number of other decisions in which it had been
held that shopping center lease restrictions did not violate antitrust statutes, and
it stated that it shared the same view.16 1 The court held that there would be no
violation of the Valentine Act "as long as the scope and effect of the restriction
is not unreasonably broad".'6 It explained that the lease restriction before it
was not unreasonably broad:
The restriction in the case at bar is not unreasonably broad in
scope or effect. The restriction does not affect the entire
community, only the shopping center (a restaurant with a full

id. at 203, 407 N.E.2d at 508.
'5'

OHio REV. CODE §§ 1331.01 et seq.

'6 63 Ohio St. 2d at 206, 407 N.E.2d at 510.
161 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963).
" 63 Ohio St. 2d at 205, 407 N.E.2d at 509, quoting Savon Gas Stations Number Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil

Co., 309 F.2d 306, 309 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911 (1963).
63 Ohio St. 2d at 206, 407 N.E.2d at 510.

Published
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liquor permit operates across the street). In addition appellant is
permitted to sell beer. As a consequence, appellees have not

violated R.C. Chapter 133 1.165

This test of reasonableness coincides with the general test for evaluating the
reasonableness of an ancillary restriction announced by the same court more than
120 years earlier in Lange v. Werk.' 66
Unlike restrictive covenants given in connection with the sale of a
business or entered in connection with employment, restrictive lease covenants
have been extensively evaluated for reasonableness under the federal and state
antitrust statutes. The focus of analysis under the statutes is still the reasonableness of the restriction. These statute-based decisions must be reviewed, if only
because they contain much of the more recent analysis on the enforceability of
restrictive lease covenants."6 We will now turn to them.
The Ohio Attorney General filed a complaint in September 1973 against
Andrew Palzes, Inc., a women's clothing store in Brecksville, alleging that the
exclusivity clause in its lease violated the Valentine Act.168 Under the exclusivity clause, the lessor agreed not to lease other space in the Brecksville Shopping
Center to any other retailer of "so-called 'High Priced Quality' Women's
Wear"69 Subsequent to entering into the lease with Palzes, the landlord
entered into another lease with a second women's clothing store, Bambi Fashion
Shop. The landlord restricted the second lessee to the sale of clothing to "teenage petite and junior miss sizes", with a ceiling of $25 per individual garment
other than suits and coats, and suits and coats to be sold for less than $40.170
Following commencement of an action by the Attorney General to bar
enforcement of the covenant in favor of Palzes, the parties agreed to a final
injunction, including the following findings of fact:
.[T]he agreement fixed the prices above which Bambi could
not sell; ... the agreement was intended to limit and eliminate

'"Id.(footnote omitted).
'"2 Ohio St. 520,530 (1853). See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. The holding also coincides
with an early decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressing a covenant under
which a lessee was prohibited from using the premises, a mill, to make strawboard in competition with
the lessor. American Strawboard Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 F. 619, 624 (1897). The court approved
the restriction because it was "no larger than necessary for the protection of the owner and lessor". Il
For an overview of the cases addressing the legality of lease restrictions under state and federal
antitrust statutes, see generally 3 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 152, at § 28.8.
'7

" State ex rel. Brown v. Palzes, Inc., 39 Ohio Misc. 155, 317 N.E.2d 262 (C.P. 1974).
'9
"Id.

at 156, 317 N.E.2d at 263.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
'10 Id. at 157, 317 N.E.2d at 264.
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competition between Bambi and Palzes; and ... the agreement
did, in effect, so limit7 competition between the two defendant
retail women's stores.1 1
With these findings, it did not take much imagination to conclude that Palzes had
been party to a classic price-fixing agreement, per se illegal under the Valentine
Act.' 72 Observing that the Ohio courts have followed, in applying the Valentine
Act, the federal courts' interpretation of the Sherman Act, the court then went on
to describe the status of
price-fixing agreements as per se illegal under Section
1 3
I of the Sherman Act'
The Ohio Attorney General brought a companion case in May of 1974
against Zayre of Ohio, Inc., State ex rel. Brown v. Zayre of Ohio, Inc.174 The
Attorney General challenged an exclusive lease in favor of Zayre at the Mentor
City Shopping Center, where Zayre was the major tenant. Under the lease, the
landlord covenanted not to lease to any store "advertised as a so-called discount
type operation"; not to lease to any apparel store unless it was a "so-called higher
priced store"; and not to lease to any drug store if it was engaged in discounting. 175 Zayre partially waived the restriction against a discounter as a tenant
when it permitted A & P, another tenant at the shopping center, to sublease
storeroom space to Esco Distributing Company, a discount catalog showroom, on
condition that Esco pay Zayre $8,000 per year for each year of its sublease. 76
In common with the final judgment in Palzes, the parties agreed to the
terms of the final order. The parties stipulated to the following facts:
The court finds that the above-described covenants in the lease
agreement between the landlord and Zayre are a combination to
create and carry out restrictions in trade or commerce, to prevent,

'Id.

'72

at 158, 317 N.E.2d at 264-65.
Id. at 160, 317 N.E.2d at 265-66.

Id. at 161, 317 N.E.2d at 266. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Prioe-fixing agreements, whether among competitors or imposed by a manufacturer or its distributors, have
'73

long been deemed illegal per se under Section 1. See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335,
341-42 (1987) (vertical agreement); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980)
(horizontal agreement). As a per se illegal restraint, the agreement cannot be defended as reasonable.
Inquiry into market conditions or other justifications for the agreement is foreclosed. See, e.g., Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. at 645-47; National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 692-96 (1978). The violation inheres in the agreement, and anticompetitive impact follows as
an irrebuttable presumption. See generally 7 P. AREEDA, ANTiTRuST LAW

per se rule applied to price-fixing cartels).
174 41 Ohio Misc. 117, 324 N.E.2d 186 (C.P. 1974).
'7" Id. at 118, 324 N.E.2d at 187.
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hinder and limit competition, and to affect the prices both Zayre
and its potential competitors may charge. The use of these lease
provisions to prevent for a period of time the entry of Esco,
another discount store operation and potential competitor of
Zayre, and then to condition entry upon the payment of $8,000
per year from one competitor to another, demonstrates the
anticompetitive character of such a combination. The necessary
and probable effect of such restraints is to impede the ability of
Esco, or any other potential competitor of Zayre effectively to
compete on price and otherwise, and thereby deprive the
public of the benefits of free and open competiconsuming
177
tion.
These findings were more than adequate to support the conclusion that Zayre had
engaged in price-fixing, per se illegal under the Valentine Act. 78 The legal
discussion in the opinion closely tracks that in Palzes and draws directly on some
of the text from the Palzes opinion.
Taken together, the Palzes and Zayre cases stand for the unremarkable
proposition that price-fixing agreements, even when embodied in leases, are per
se illegal, necessitating no inquiry into market conditions and permitting no
inquiry into justification. Even though both decisions are consent decrees, their
publication as opinions of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas has
given them circulation and precedential value they might not otherwise deserve.
As will be seen, however, they have been distinguished, rather than followed, in
later cases and are likely no longer good law.
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the legality under the Valentine Act
of restrictive lease covenants in Fairview Shopping Center.179 The restrictive
clause before the court did not limit the price at which other stores could sell; it
barred the lessor from permitting the sale at the shopping center of any non-beer
alcoholic beverages, regardless of price, by any tenant other than the covenantee,
Fairview Lounge. 80

177 Id.

'7 Id. at 121, 324 N.E.2d at 188-189.
17 C. K. & J. K., Inc. v. Fairview Shopping Center Corp., 63 Ohio St2d 201, 407 N.E.2d 507 (1980).
See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case generally.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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The court noted at the outset that it would be guided in its interpretation
of the Valentine Act by the federal courts' interpretation of the Sherman AcL' 8'
The court neither cited or referred to Palzes or Zayre nor essayed any discussion
of the per se rule. It held, instead, that the appropriate test for evaluating the
legality under the Valentine Act of restrictions in a shopping center lease is the

"rule of reason" -- the operative test under the ancillary restraint doctrine:
"Contracts in restraint of trade are not illegal except when
unreasonable in character. When such contracts are incident and

ancillary to some lawful business and are not unreasonable in
their scope and operation they are not illegal."'"

An attempt to rely upon Palzes and Zayre to invalidate a lease covenant
was turned aside by the Court of Appeals for Stark County in Carm's Foods,
Inc. v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co.11 3 There, a grocery store, Carm's, sued
to enforce against another tenant its exclusive right to operate the only supermarket in the shopping center, Hillsdale Shopping Center.'" The covenant was the
same type of covenant addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Fairview
Shopping Center: a promise by the lessor that the tenant would have the
exclusive right to conduct a particular type of retail trade in the shopping center.

..Id. at 204, 407 N.E.2d at 509. Without explicitly holding that the Ohio courts in interpreting the
Valentine Act should follow the federal courts in their interpretation of the Sherman Act, the Ohio
Supreme Court had made it very clear earlier in List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio
St. 361,374, 151 N.E. 471, 475 (1926), that this was the appropriate approach for determining the content
of the Valentine Act. See also State ex rel. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 520, 548,
56 N.. 464, 467 (1900); Freeman v. Miller, 21 Ohio Dec. 766, 772 (Super. Ct. 1909). Accord Rutman
Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 737-38 (6th Cir. 1987) (Ohio law).
18 63 Ohio St.2d at 205, 407 N.E.2d at 509, quoting List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114
Ohio St. 361, 151 N.E. 471 (1926) (Syllabus 4). The United States Supreme Court held that the legality
of agreements and combinations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act should be evaluated under the rule
of reason in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). See generally 7 P. AREEDA,
supra note 173, at 1501. It did so because it concluded that Congress had intended that the terms used
in Section 1 should have the meaning and construction they had acquired at common law. See United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-81 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. at 51-59; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 346-55 (1897) (White, J.,
dissenting). On Congress' intention in incorporating into the Sherman Act terms having established
common law meanings, see generally Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of The Sherman Act, 9 J.
L. & ECON. 7,21-26,36-37 (1966); Carey, The Sherman Act: What Did Congress Intend? 34 ANTrrRusT
BULL 337 (1989); Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 1029-41; Letwin, Congress and The Sherman Antitrust

Law. 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 221, 242-47 (1956).
The Valentine Act was, likewise, deemed to be declaratory of the common law of restraints of
trade. See, e.g., List v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n, 114 Ohio St. at 378, 151 N.E. at 476
("'The established interpretation of modern anti-trust legislation is that such laws are declaratory of the
common law, and are enacted to provide the machinery for preventing the abuses of combination and cooperation and for penalizing and punishing those transactions which by the settled principles of the
common law are declared to be unlawful').
18 No. CA-6309 (Ohio Ct. App. May 14, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
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The trial court had declined to enforce the covenant because, on the
authority of Zayre, it concluded that the covenant was a violation of the Valentine
Act. The court of appeals pointed out that Zayre was a price-fixing case and that
there was absolutely nothing in the exclusive covenant before the court to suggest
any price-fixing:
The very essence of the shopping center mechanism for merchandising is the mutually beneficial development of a compodium
[sic] of different merchandising and service appliers offering to
the public a diverse range of purchasing opportunities. This area
of commerce would be virtually paralyzed if the view were
adopted that restrictive provisions, mutually enforceable, in a
shopping center, going to the provision of different, rather than
like, goods and services violate the Valentine Act. Such a center
could hardly induce tenants or be commercially viable. The
essence of competition is not within a shopping center but
between
shopping centers. That is particularly true in urban ar85
eas.1
The court's analysis correctly focused on the competitive implications of
the restrictive covenant. The covenant restrained competition within a narrow
compass -- the shopping center -- but thereby contributed to increased competition
between shopping centers. This weighing of pro-competitive against anticompetitive effects stands at the center of rule of reason analysis under the
ancillary restraint doctrine.1 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio viewed
Palzes and Zayre the same way in Child World Inc. v. South Towne Centre
Ltd.17 Plaintiff, operating a toy store under the name Children's Palace, sought
to enforce an exclusivity clause against its landlord, the owner of South Towne
Centre in Miami Township. The landlord promised that it would not use or
permit any other person to use the shopping center or any other property within

"1

Id. slip op. at 3.

The same analysis is followed under Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)). For
example, in evaluating non-price vertical restraints, such as limitations on a dealer's resale activities, the
federal courts follow the rule of reason. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
"*

58-59 (1977). Under this methodology for evaluating vertical restraints, the pro-competitive effects are
weighed against the anti-competitive effects. See, e.g., Valley liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd.
822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek
Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1572-78 (11 th Cir. 1983). If the restraints strengthen interbrand competition, they
will be deemed reasonable, even though intrabrand competition may thereby be reduced. See, e.g., Crane
& Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 1988); Valley Liquors, Inc. v.
Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d at 666.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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six miles of the shopping center for the operation of a toy store.' 88 When the
owner of the shopping center entered into an agreement with Toys "R" Us, Inc.,
to build a toy store within a half-mile of the shopping center, plaintiff, Child
an action to enforce the covenant, Section 43(A) of the lease
World, brought
9
agreement.'1
The court addressed the legality of Section 43(A) under both Section 1
of the Sherman Act and the Valentine Act. After concluding that the clause did
not constitute a per se illegal restraint under Section 1, the court considered
whether it was per se illegal under the Valentine Act. The court held that the
clause was not per se illegal,' 90 and it readily distinguished Palzes and Zayre
as price-fixing cases:
Unlike the provisions deemed illegal per se in Palzes and Zayre,
Section 43(A) in no way attempts to manipulate or limit the
prices of any other store at South Towne Shopping Center or
elsewhere. Nor does Section 43(A) prohibit Defendants' rental
or sale to any store except the "copycat" store, that is, a toy and
games store selling primarily toys, games, children's furniture
and sporting goods in the image of a Children's Palace store.
Thus, Defendants are free under Section 43(A) to lease or sell to
stores selling competitive goods at every and any price range.
There is no evidence in the record as to any impact upon prices
stemming from Toys "R" Us' inability to erect a store on
Defendants' property. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
Section 43(A) is not illegal per se under the Valentine ACL19 1
The court then turned to consider whether the clause was nonetheless a
violation of the Valentine Act under the rule of reason. The court found no
material difference between Section 43(A) and the clause before the Ohio
Supreme Court in Fairview Shopping Center.'9 It turned aside defendants'
contention that it was a matter of some consequence that the clause in Fairview
Shopping Center created an exclusive within the shopping center itself whereas
IId. at 1123-24.

Id. at 1124.
I'
190For examples of cases, other than Palzes and Zayre, in which a per se violation of the Valentine Act

has been established, see State ex rel. Monnett v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 61 Ohio St. 520, 548-49, 56
N.E. 464, 467-68 (1900) (combination of competitors restraining competition in the production,

transportation and refining of petroleum in order to stabilize prices); Fisher v. Flickinger Wheel Co., 18
Ohio Cir. Dec. 501,508-09 (Cir. CL 1906) (combination of wood wheel manufacturers in Ohio, Michigan
and Indiana to control production and stabilize prices); Freeman v. Miller, 21 Ohio Dec. 766, 770-72
(Super. Ct. 1909) (resale price maintenance agreement between supplier and retailers of certain proprietary
articles, such as perfumes).
'9'

Id. at 1130.
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Section 43(A) established a six-mile exclusivity radius, with the shopping center
at the middle.' 9 The court noted that, in any event, it need not consider
whether enforcement of the covenant to the full six-mile extent would be reasonable, because the issue before it was whether it would be reasonable to enforce
it to the extent of one-half mile, the distance of the proposed Toys "R" Us store
from Children's Palace.' 94 Having already held that Section 43(A) did not
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act under the rule of reason, the court had no
difficulty concluding that there was no violation of the Valentine Act under the
rule of reason. 95
It was axiomatic at common law that a restrictive covenant was to be
viewed with disfavor. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in Lufkin Rule
Co. v. Fringeli,196 restrictive covenants are presumptively unreasonable. 9 7
The necessary procedural implication that follows is that plaintiff, the covenantee,
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of unreasonableness. In contrast,
the district court in Child World imposed on the defendants the "burden of
showing unreasonableness".198 Having raised the statutory violation as an
affirmative defense, it was appropriate for the court to leave with the defendants
the burden of showing a violation of Section 1 under the rule of reason. 99
Although the court did not directly consider whether, entirely apart from
the various affirmative statutory antitrust defenses, enforcement of the covenant
would be reasonable, it observed in discussing the failure of defendants to carry
their burden under Section 1 that the facts "underscore the reasonableness of
Section 43(A) as applied".2 °° The court did not explain how it arrived at this
determination, but it presumably took into account some of the criteria it listed
as bearing on reasonableness under Section 1:
(1) the relevant product and geographic markets, together with
the showing of unreasonable impact upon competition in these
markets, due to the restrictive covenant; (2) the availability of
alternate sites for the entity excluded by the operation of such a

19

id.

,94
Id. at 1134.
'9 Id.

The court followed the directive of the Ohio Supreme Court in Fairview Shopping Center and

other cases that courts should follow the federal courts' interpretation of the federal antitrust statutes in
enforcing the Valentine Act. See generally supra note 181 and accompanying text
'9657 Ohio St 596, 602-03, 49 N.E. 1030, 1032 (1898).
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
o 634 F. Supp. at 1132.
'9Id. at 1130.
'97

20

1 d. at 1131.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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covenant; (3) the significance of the competition eliminated by
the exclusivity clause, and whether present or future competitors

were the parties excluded; (4) the scope of the restrictive
covenant and whether it varied depending upon particular

circumstances;
of the restrictiveand (5) the economic justification for the inclusion
covenant in the lease.20

Palzes and Zayre may be the only judicial decisions anywhere condemning lease covenants as per se violations of antitrust statutes, 2' and they

constitute, at this point, little more than an anomaly in the development of the law
of restrictive lease covenants. Not only can they be readily distinguished because
of explicit findings that the covenants in question were intended to and had the
effect of fixing prices, but they may very well no longer constitute good law,
even on their facts. The Ohio Supreme Court held in FairviewShopping Center,

decided six years after the two decisions, that lease covenants are to be evaluated
under the rule of reason. The court did not carve out or create any exception for
covenants that may have price implications. Efforts to classify lease restrictions
as per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act have since been rejected by
the federal courts,20 3 and the United States Supreme Court has since significantly curtailed the reach of the per se rule generally, 2 ' holding, for example, that
even though concerted conduct may have impact on pricing, that circumstance is

not sufficient to warrant application of the per se rule.2°5
As the Ohio Supreme Court recognized in Fairview Shopping Center,
analysis under the rule of reason is not qualitatively different from analysis under

20'

Id. at 1130-31.

One commentator has recently observed that no federal court has ever held a lease restriction per se
illegal. Note, supra note 152, at 1197, The Federal Trade Commission has done so, however. The
Commission ruled in Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 1004, 1008-10 (1975). that an
approval clause, giving a major tenant veto power over the admission of new tenants to a shopping center,
was per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and therefore a violation of Section 5(a) of the
FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982)). It so concluded because the power to exclude competitors gave it,
in the Commission's view, the power to control prices. 85 F.T.C. at 1009-10.
The FTC negotiated consent decrees with a number of developers and retailers over the terms
of lease restrictions following Tysons Corner. They reflect the Commission's interest in the mid- and late
1970's in the activities of regional shopping malls but have limited precedential value, as such. For a
review of the consent decrees and discussion of their implications, see generally Marsh, supra note 153.
at 857-64; Note, supra note 151, at 1202-05.
'0 E.g., Harold Friedman Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts. Inc., 582 F.2d 127, 141-42 (3d Cir. 1978); Child World,
Inc. v. South Towne Centre, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1121, 1129 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
204 See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1519-21 (1988) (dealer
termination); Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (group
boycott); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (horizontal
combination); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 16-24 (1979)
(horizontal price-fixing combination). See generally ABA ANTIrRUsr SECrIoN, ANTITRUST LAw
2m

DEVELOPMENTS 22-24 (2d ed. 1984).
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the ancillary restraint doctrine. They are, in point of fact, one and the same.

Lease restrictions are evaluated under Ohio law using the classic ancillary
restraint criterion of reasonableness: Is the restraint no broader than necessary to
protect the legitimate interests of the covenantee? 2"
The nature of the covenantee's interests to be protected, the geographic
reach of the restriction and the availability of alternate sites for the competitor
affected by the restriction can all be taken into account in evaluating reasonableness, but no effort will be made here to detail how each of these has been
weighed in the cases. Suffice it to say that, Palzes and Zayre to the contrary
notwithstanding, lease restrictions have readily been enforced by the Ohio courts,
and Ohio law on their enforceability is generally consistent with the law of other
jurisdictions.2"
C.

Restrictive Covenants Incident to Employment.

By far the largest body of case law on the enforceability of restrictive

covenants has grown out of efforts by employers to enforce noncompetition
covenants against former employees. Judge Taft observed that these promises not

to compete were among the ancillary restraints upheld at common law. 2 8 They

were enforced, he noted, if they were "reasonably necessary" for protection of the
employer "from the danger of loss to the employer's business caused by the
unjust use on the part of the employe of the confidential knowledge acquired in
such business". t° The focus was on protection of the competitive position of
the covenantee.

206

1 Proving reasonableness under the ancillary restraint doctrine will, in most cases, pose fewer difficulties

than proving unreasonableness under the Sherman Act or the Valentine Act. Proof of a violation of
Section I of the Sherman Act or the Valentine Act under the rule of reason will in virtually every case
necessitate a detailed inquiry into the boundaries of the relevant service or product and geographic
markets, the barriers to entry into the market, the percentage of the relevant market adversely affected by
the restraint and other economic details demanded by the antitrust case law. For representative decisions
applying these elements of proof to lease restriction cases, see, e.g., Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters.,
Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188-91 (7th Cir. 1985) (IlL law); Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts. Inc., 587
F.2d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1978) (Section 1 of Sherman Act); Drabbant Enters., Inc. v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 688 F. Supp. 1567, 1578-82 (D. Del. 1988) (Section 2 of Sherman Act); Child World,
Inc. v. South Towne Centre, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1121, 1130-31 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (Section 1 of Sherman
Act; Valentine Act). No such rigorous economic analysis stands as an obstacle to a covenantee's
enforcement of a restrictive lease covenant. Nor is it needed if a practice is deemed to be illegal per se.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1982) (price-fixing);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1978) (same). It was
undoubtedly the simplicity of per se analysis that encouraged early efforts to apply it to lease restrictions,
thereby short-cutting the burdensome proof needed for Sherman Act liability under the rule of reason.
See Note, supra note 151, at 1211-12.
m See generally 3 M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 152, at §§ 28.1, .8.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 85 F. 271, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211

201

(1899).

219 Id. at 281.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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Chief Justice Tindal had earlier addressed the enforceability of noncompetition covenants against former employees in Homer v. Graves.2 10 Following
Mitchel v. Reynolds,21 1 he observed that a restraint of trade, not amounting to
It was a matter
a general restraint, could be enforced if it were reasonable.
of no consequence that Mitchel v. Reynolds was a case in which the covenant
sought to be enforced was incident to the sale of a business whereas the covenant
sought to be enforced in Homer v. Graves was incident to an employment
relationship. The question was simply whether the restraint, barring a surgeondentist from practicing within 100 miles of York at any time after his termination
of employment, was "a reasonable restraint of trade". 3
The Chief Justice commented that the covenant in Mitchel v. Reynolds
was enforced because it was "not unreasonable either as to the time or distance,
and not larger than might be necessary for the protection of the plaintiff in his
established trade".1 4 Applying this standard to the covenant before him, he
concluded that the restraint was unreasonable because it "shut out" the former
employee "from a much wider field than can by possibility be occupied
beneficially" by the employer.1 5
The Ohio Supreme Court did not address the enforceability of employee
noncompetition covenants until 1942 in Briggs v. Butler,21 6 but it followed the
same analysis. Before turning to the particulars of the case law on employee
restraints, it will prove instructive to review the few decisions of the Ohio
Supreme Court on the subject.
Butler was a former employee of Briggs, who operated an advertising
company in the Toledo area under the name The Welcome Wagon Service
Company. Upon beginning employment with Briggs, Butler signed a "Hostess
Contract" outlining her responsibilities and providing that she would not for a
period of five years after termination of employment engage in the same kind of
business in competition with Briggs' company in Toledo or any other town in the
United States or Canada in which he may be engaged in business.21
Butler terminated her employment with Briggs and joined her husband's
newly organized business, the Toledo Newcomers Service Company, a competitor
20 7 Bingham 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (1831).
211

P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).

212 7 Bingham at 741-42, 131 Eng. Rep. at 287.
213 Id.
214

21-Id.
216

at 743. 131 Eng. Rep. at 287.

id.
at 744, 131 Eng. Rep. at 288.

140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942).
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of Briggs. In her new employment, she engaged in activities essentially the same
as those she had previously performed on behalf of Briggs. 2 8 Briggs then
brought an action to enforce the noncompetition covenant.
Noting that the decision in each case of this type "turns upon and in great
measure is governed by its own peculiar facts",2 1 9 the court held that the
covenant was reasonable and enforceable. It observed that Butler was not
prevented from engaging in a trade or profession, but only from engaging in
direct competition with the plaintiff:
The clear purpose and effect of the contract is to prevent or at
least to limit the appropriation of the benefits of information and
experience secured in her service with the plaintiff and the
employment thereof for her own personal advantage and to the
disadvantage of the plaintiff by becoming a direct competitor, as
in fact did occur in this instance.!"
The court turned aside any suggestion that Briggs needed to show that
Butler's services were unique as a condition for enforcement of the covenant.
Acknowledging that this was an essential element of proof in any attempt to
secure specific enforcement of a personal services contract, the court found no
need for any demonstration of uniqueness where a post-employment restraint is
sought to be enforced:
That necessity of showing the uniqueness of the employee's
service does not exist where the covenant sought to be enforced
is one limiting or precluding competitive activities subsequent to
the termination of the employment .... 2
The court concluded that the covenants of the contract should be enforced
because they
do not impose a restraint beyond that reasonably required for the
protection of the employer in his business.... are not unreasonably restrictive upon the rights of the employee and do not

contravene public policy .... 2M

2I1

Id. at 504, 45 N.E.2d at 760.

219Id. at 510, 45 N.E.2d at 762.
220

Id., 45 N.E.2d at 763.

22'

Id. at 510-11, 45 N.E.2d at 763.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/1
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It observed that this conclusion was "in no wise inconsistent with" earlier
decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court on the enforceability of covenants incident
to the sale of a business. 2 3
The court in Briggs neither suggested nor undertook any departure from

the ancillary restraint analysis of the earlier cases. It saw no need to, and did not,
fashion any new or special rule for the enforcement of noncompetition covenants
incident to employment.
In its next review of an employment noncompetition covenant, the Ohio
Supreme Court held, in Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc.,2m that covenants
can be enforced partially if they are divisible. Approving the "blue pencil"
test, 5 the court declined to enforce two of the four restrictions on Extine's
post-employment activities.226 The court observed, in passing, that trade
restraints are reasonable if no broader than needed to protect the legitimate

interests of the covenantee:
"An agreement in restraint of trade is reasonable if, on consider-

ation of the subject matter, the nature of the business, the
situation of the parties and the circumstances of the particular
case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the
interests of the covenantee and not so large as to interfere with
the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party re-

stricted. "227
This general formulation of reasonableness reads as though it were
borrowed directly from Chief Justice Tindal's formulation 130 years earlier in
2
Horner v. Graves."

The court then suggested a list of specific factors that

The court cited Lufldn Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St 596, 49 N.E. 1030 (1898); Morgan v.
Perhamus, 36 Ohio St. 517 (1881); Thomas v. Administrator of Miles, 3 Ohio St. 275 (1854); and Lange
v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 520 (1853).
223 Id.

22
20

176 Ohio St. 403, 200 N.E.2d 297 (1964).
Under the "blue pencil" approach to enforcement of a restrictive covenant, the court ascertains whether

it can enforce a covenant partially by striking a clause that would otherwise make the covenant
unreasonable. To do so, the court must first conclude that the contract is divisible and that the offending
term -- typically relating to the geographic scope or duration of the covenant - can be severed without
rewriting the contract. For a review of Ohio case law on the divisibility of restrictive employment
covenants, see generally Burndy Corp. v. Cahill, 196 F. Supp. 619, 623-26 (D. Minn. 1961), rev'd on
other grounds, 301 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1962); Kreider, Trends in the Enforcement of Restrictive
Employment Contracts, 35 U. CIN. L REv. 16, 24-30 (1966); Note, supra note 142, at 178-81.
26 176 Ohio St. at 406-07, 200 N.E.2d at 299-300.
Id. at 405-06, 200 N.E.2d at 299, quoting 17 C.J.S., Contracts § 247 at 1124 (1963).
2

7 Bingham 735, 743, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (1831). See supra note 11 and accompanying text for
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might be taken into account, other than limitations of time or space, in evaluating
reasonableness:
[W]hether the employee represents the sole contact with the
customer, whether the employee is possessed with confidential
information or trade secrets; whether the covenant seeks to
eliminate competition which would be unfair to the employer or
merely seeks to eliminate ordinary competition; whether the
covenant seeks to stifle the inherent skill and experience of the
employee; whether the benefit to the employer is disproportional
to the detriment to the employee; whether the covenant operates
as a bar to the employee's sole means of support; whether the
employee's talent which the employer seeks to suppress was
actually developed during the period of employment; and whether
the forbidden employment is merely incidental to the main

employmenL

9

The court abandoned the blue pencil test eleven years later in Raimonde v.
Van Vlerah.230 It there held, instead, that covenants will be enforced, regardless
of the divisibility of contract terms, to the extent reasonable:

We hold that a covenant not to compete which imposes unreasonable restrictions upon an employee will be enforced to the extent
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests. A
covenant restraining an employee from competing with his
former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable
if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the

employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and
is not injurious to the public. Courts are empowered to modify
or amend employment agreements to achieve such results. 3 '

22 176 Ohio St at 406, 200 N.E.2d at 299.

2" 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).
d. at 25-26, 325 N.E.2d at 547. The court's decision to enforce restrictive covenants to the extent
reasonable was anything but revolutionary. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had done the same more than 60 years earlier in Prame v. Ferrell, 166 F. 702, 704-05 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 215 U.S. 605 (1909). On the gradual abandonment of the blue pencil rule in favor of partial
enforcement, see generally 6A A. CORBIN. supra note 1, at § 1390; Comment, Post-Employment Restraint
Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 703, 710 (1985); Kreider, supra note 225, at 24-26.
For a discussion of partial enforcement in a representative jurisdiction outside Ohio, see Comment,
Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in Pennsylvania Employment Contracts, 80 DICK. L REV. 693,70810 (1976).
23'
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The Raimonde court ventured no substantive change in ancillary restraint analysis

as it is applied to employment relationships.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decisions on the enforceability of employment

restraints neither recognize nor suggest any special rule for evaluating restraints
ancillary to employment.2 32 If they support any inference in favor of a special

rule for evaluating employment covenants, it is only that the covenantee should
be protected in every case to the extent reasonable. In rejecting the blue pencil
test, the Raimonde court made it clear that it would not permit the rule of
divisibility to stand in the way of protecting employers' interests to the extent
reasonable. 233

Although it has been stated that the decision to reform a particular overbroad or otherwise
unreasonable restriction is within the trial court's discretion, see, e.g., Professional Investigations &

Consulting Agency, Inc. v. Kingsland, No. 90AP-108, slip op. at 4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1990) (1990
WL 152914 (Ohio App.)) (reformation denied), the trial court has an affirmative duty to determine
whether an unreasonable restraint can be enforced at least partially, see, e.g., Rogers v. Runfola &
Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 8, 565 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1991); Miller Medical Sales, Inc. v. Worstell,
No. 89 AP-918, slip op. at 2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. April 24, 1990) (1990 WL 52526 (Ohio App.)). The
court's task is not at an end simply because it has concluded that a restraint, as written or sought to be
applied, is unreasonable.
2 See also Note, supra note 142, at 168; Note, Employer Protectionfrom Employee Competition after
a Term of Employment, 4 01IO ST. L.J. 263, 264-66 (1939). By the second decade of the twentiethcentury, case law had emerged in some jurisdictions recognizing special rules for evaluating reasonableness of employee noncompetition covenants. Special judicial solicitude for what was seen as the inferior
bargaining power of employees justified, in some courts' view, treatment for employee noncompetition
covenants different from that for noncompetition covenants incident to the sale of a business. See, e.g.,
Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn. 248, 252-53, 108 A. 541, 543 (1919); Herbert Morris, Ltd. v.
Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688, 701,709. See generally Blake, supra note 6, at 643-46; Handler & Lazaroff,
supra note 140, at 728-30; Note, supra note 142, at 167-69. For an examination of why there is no sound
basis for separate treatment of employee noncompetition covenants, see Comment, supra note 231, 52 U.
Cmi. L. REV. at 712-25; see also Wetzel, Employment Contracts and Noncompetition Agreements, 1969
U. ILL L.F. 61, 64. Williston saw no justification for any separate rules for this branch of the ancillary
restraint doctrine:
Whether this distinction is logically tenable seems open to question. If it is rightful
to protect the business when it is purchased it should be lawful to protect an
established business from injury by an employee, unless circumstances of great
hardship exist The ultimate question should be the same in both cases, what is

necessary for the protection of the promisee's rights and is not injurious to the
public.
14 S. WILLSTON, supra note 1, at § 1643 at 148-51 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
In addition to satisfying the criterion of reasonableness, an employee noncompetition covenant is
enforceable by the employer only if it is supported by adequate consideration. This is fully consistent
with the general test of enforceability of restrictive covenants announced in Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St.
520, 528 (1853), see supra note 42 and accompanying text, but it is in the area of employment restraints
2

that lack of consideration is repeatedly and most often raised as an affirmative defense. Any covenant
entered into after commencement of employment must be supported by separate, independent

consideration. E.g., Moraine Indus. Supply, Inc. v. Sterling Rubber Prods. Co., No. 86-3956, slip op. at
2 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library) (Ohio law) (change from at-will employment is
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The Ohio Supreme Court underscored this judicial objective in Rogers v.
Runfola & Associates, Inc.234 Rogers and Marrone were employed as court

reporters for a number of years by Runfola & Associates, a court reporting firm
in Columbus. When they resigned and set up their own reporting firm, Runfola
reminded them that they had signed employment contracts with noncompetition
covenants. The employees thereupon filed an action seeking a declaration that
235

the covenants were unenforceable; Runfola counterclaimed for enforcement.

After turning aside contentions that the underlying employment contracts
were unenforceable, the court considered whether the covenants were reasonable.

Focusing on the covenants' prohibition against engaging in court reporting or
stenography in Franklin County for two years and their prohibition against
soliciting, for a lifetime, any of Runfola's clients, the court concluded that the
restraints, and "resultant hardships" on Rogers and Marrone, exceeded those that
were reasonable to protect Runfola's "legitimate business interests". 236
The court stated that this conclusion did not end its inquiry, however.
Even though, as worded, the covenants were unreasonable, the court explained
that it "must also determine" whether some restrictions would be necessary to

sufficient consideration); Barnes Group, Inc. v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454, 461 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Ohio
law); Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio St. 3d 5,6-7, 565 N.E.2d 540,542 (1991) (change from
at-will employment constitutes sufficient consideration); Myers Servs., Inc. v. Costello, No. CA-917, slip
op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1989) (1989 WL 76464 (Ohio App.)); Apronstrings, Inc. v. Tomaric,
No. 11-272, slip op. at 2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1987) (1987 WL 15445 (Ohio App.)) (no enforcement
where covenant signed, without any new consideration, two weeks after commencement of employment);

J & L Sales, Inc. v. Natali, No. 85 C.A. 71, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1986) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file); Columbus Medical Equip. Co. v. Watters, 13 Ohio App. 3d 149, 150, 468 N.E.2d 343,
346 (1983).
Continued employment is not itself sufficient consideration to support enforcement of a
restrictive covenant. E.g., Prinz Office Equip. Co. v. Pesko, No. 14155, slip op. at 4-6 (Ohio Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 1990) (1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 367); Etna Prods., Inc. v. Stofey, No. 953, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 28, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Morgan Lumber Sales Co. v. Toth, 41 Ohio Misc.
17, 19 (C.P. 1974). Accord, e.g., Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. 1990).
It should be, as other jurisdictions have held. See generally Annot., Sufficiency of Consideration for
Employee's Covenant not to Compete, Entered into after Inception of Employment. 51 A.L.R. 3d 825,

835-39 (1973). In noting in Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio St. 3d at 6, 565 N.E.2d at 542,
that courts will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, the Ohio Supreme Court implied that there
should be no special, idiosyncratic test of consideration for employment restrictive covenants. The court
did not explicitly repudiate, however, the line of Ohio cases holding that continued employment does not
constitute adequate consideration.
2m 57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 565 N.E.2d 540 (1991).
2" Id. at 6, 565 N.E.2d at 542.
-1Id.at 8, 565 N.E.2d at 544.
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protect Runfola's business interests.237 It had no difficulty identifying pro-

tectable interests. It observed that Runfola had invested "time and money in
equipment, facilities, support staff and training" for the employees.2 3 It also
observed that Runfola had developed over the years a clientele with whom the
former employees had had "direct contact".239 These interests were more than
sufficient to justify partial enforcement of the covenants, even in the face of

hardship to the employees.
A review of the case law will confirm that Ohio has recognized no
analysis for employment ancillary restraints that differs in any material respect

from the analysis generally applicable. The rule of reason remains the test.
Protection of the covenantee's market position against unfair advantage that might
otherwise be gained by a competitor hiring a former employee has been the
judicial objective. We will begin with a review of the types of employer interests
for which protection may be appropriate and then consider the weight to be given
to employee hardship and the public interest in evaluating reasonableness,
followed by consideration of the scope of restraints.24
1.

Employer's Interests to be Protected.

Unlike goodwill, which is the protected interest of the covenantee in
every sale of a business, the covenantee's interests to be protected against

competition from a former employee may vary from case to case. Two broad
categories of interest are conceded, however. It is universally recognized that an
237

id.

238 id.

2" Id. at 8-9, 565 N.E.2d at 544.

'0 Even though this review of the common law of employment noncompetition covenants necessarily
focuses on Ohio law, analysis of the enforceability of these covenants under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act draws heavily upon the ancillary restraint doctrine. Section 1, which prohibits unreasonable restraints
of competition, rarely has even colorable application to an employee restrictive covenant, which is,
typically, intended to protect a competitor, not competition in a relevant market See DeSantis v.
Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 687-88 (rex. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1991); Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 140, at 752-55. For representative cases in which employee
restrictive covenants have been evaluated under Section 1, see, e.g., Bradford v. New York Times Co.,
501 F.2d 51, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 307-08 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); see also Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057,
1082 (2d Cir. 1977) (restriction on former partner's employment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
For rather ambitious views of the applicability of Section 1 to employee noncompetition covenants, not
borne out by the case law, see generally Sullivan, Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust
Treatment of Postemployment Restraints of Trade, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 621; Goldschmid, Antitrust's
Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants under Federal Law, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193 (1973). For an opposing view, see Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 140, at 752-55.
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employer has a protectable interest in maintaining the confidentiality of trade
secrets and other proprietary information. It is equally well established that an
employer has a protectable interest in preserving the goodwill incident to an
employee's customer contacts on behalf of the employer. Judicial recognition of
other protectable interests has been limited, but there is no analytical or
conceptual bar to recognizing other interests as circumstances may warrant. The
various categories of protectable interests are discussed below.
Trade Secrets. If an employer has disclosed trade secrets or other
confidential information to enable an employee to perform his job, a covenant
preventing the employee from subsequently accepting employment with a direct
competitor has, typically, been deemed reasonable. Judge Taft explained why the
restriction is needed to protect the employer's interests:
Again, it was of importance that business men and professional
men should have every motive to employ the ablest assistants,
and to instruct them thoroughly; they would naturally be reluctant
to do so unless such assistants were able to bind themselves not
to set up a rival business in the vicinity after learning the details
and secrets of the business of their employers.'
It is also consistent with the public interest:

". In such a case the public derives an advantage in the
unrestrained choice which such a stipulation gives to the employer of able assistants, and the security it affords that the master
will not withhold from the servant instruction in the secrets of his
trade, and the communication of his own skill and experience,
from the fear of his afterwards having a rival in the same
business."242
The Ohio courts have encountered no difficulty in holding that a trade
secret or confidential business information 3 is appropriately protected with a

24

United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), afJ'd, 175 U.S. 211

(1899).
Id., quoting Mallan v. May, 11 M & W. 653, 666, 152 Eng. Rep. 967, 972 (Ex. 1843).
In determining whether information is protectable as a trade secret or other confidential information,
the Ohio courts have followed the definition of a trade secret set out at Section 757 of the Restatement
20

of Torts (1939) and the definition appearing in Ohio's trade secret statute, OHIO REv. CODE § 1333.51(A)(3). See, e.g., Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv., Inc., 24 Ohio St. 3d 41, 44, 492 N.E.2d
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noncompetition covenant.2 " Unlike a trade secret misappropriation case, in
which the plaintiff must demonstrate actual or threatened disclosure or use of the
confidential information, 2 there is no justification for imposing upon an
employer the burden of proving actual or threatened use or disclosure.2 " The

814, 817 (1986). In combination, these provisions are sufficient to reach most proprietary and confidential
business information. See generally Collin, Determining Whether Information Is a Trade Secret Under
Ohio Law, 19 U. TOL L RE'. 543, 545-53 (1988).
20 See, e.g., Shury v. Rocco, No. 56214, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio CL App. March 30, 1989) (1989 WL 30538
(Ohio App.)); Levine v. Beckman, 48 Ohio App.3d 24, 27-28, 548 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1988) (trade secret
disclosure enjoined; covenant not enforced); Thompson's Supply Co. v. Vivio, No. 9562, slip op. at 5-6
(Ohio Ct. App. September 26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); J & L Sales, Inc. v. Natali, No.
85C.A. 71, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Ganguly v.
Mead Digital Sys., No. 8225, slip op. at 4-7 (Ohio Ct. App. September 20, 1984) (LEXIS, States library,
Ohio file); Garlikov v. E.M. Ellman & Assocs., 81AP-1028, slip op. at 4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. March 10,
1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Duracote Corp. v. Ryan, No. 1247, slip op. at 2-3 (Ohio CL App.
April 15, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Columbus Medical Equip. Co. v. Watters, 13 Ohio
App. 3d 149, 151,468 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1983); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104 Ohio App. 8, 1314, 146 N.E.2d 447, 451 (1957); White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 172, 176-78 (C.P. 1930).
Accord Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674 F.2d 1371, 1376-77 (11 th Cir. 1982) (Ohio law); Nordson Corp.
v. Hollingsworth, 231 U.S.P.Q. 388, 391 (D.S.C. 1986) (Ohio law); Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F.
Supp. 269, 277 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
A number of courts have cited the absence of any evidence of employee exposure to trade
secrets or confidential information as a basis for declining to enforce a noncompetition covenant. See, e.g.,
Frank, Seringer & Chancy, Inc. v. Jesko, No. 89CA004577, slip op. at 3-5 (Ohio CL App. December 6,
1989) (1989 WL 147951 (Ohio App.)); Woodhill Supply Co. v. Temple, No. 56119, slip op. at 3 (Ohio
CL App. November 16, 1989) (1989 WL 139569 (Ohio App.)); Dilworth v. Central Printing Co., No.
10534, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct App. December 22, 1988) (1988 WL 137452 (Ohio App.)); Dineen Enters.,
Inc. v. Patrick, No. 12732, slip op. at 3 (Ohio CL App. May 6,1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file);
Snarr v. Picker Corp., 29 Ohio App. 3d 254, 257, 504 N.E.2d 1168, 1172 (1985); Gobel v. Laing, 12
Ohio App. 2d 93, 96, 231 N.E.2d 341, 343 (1967); Inboden v. L.W. Hawker, Inc. 41 N.E.2d 271, 276-77
(Ohio CL App. 1941); Gates-McDonald Co. v. McQuilkin, 34 N.E.2d 443, 444-45 (Ohio CL App. 1941);
Menter & Rosenbloom Co. v. Gray, Hosea Reports 95, 98-99 (Super. CL 1899). As shown below at notes
249-66 and accompanying text, however, even though an employee may not have had access to trade
secrets or confidential information, the employer may nonetheless have other interests warranting
protection.
u The elements of proof in an action for wrongful appropriation of trade secrets have been stated to be
(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) acquisition of the trade secret by defendant as a result of a
confidential relationship and (3) unauthorized use of the secret Penetone Corp. v. Palchem, Inc., 627 F.
Supp. 977, 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (Ohio law); GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 767 (S.D. Ohio
1969) (Ohio law).
6A significant advantage of a noncompetition covenant is that it protects the employer against the risk
that trade secrets will be disclosed "next door in the near future, where the use might do the most
damage". Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 562 (4th Cir. 1990)
(Va. law). The court in Eden Ilannon & Co. explained why use of a noncompetition covenant is superior
to reliance upon trade secret misappropriation litigation for protection of the employer's interests:
: * , There are several problems with trying to prevent former employees from
illegally using the former employer's trade secrets, and these problems are caused
by the status of the law regarding the misappropriation of trade secrets. First,...
it is difficult to prove that the trade secret was actually used. Second, the former
employee tends to get "one free bite" at the trade secret. Most courts will refuse to
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inquiry, instead, is whether the employer has a legitimate interest to be protected.
If the employee had been given access to trade secrets or confidential information
in connection with the performance of his employment responsibilities, that
circumstance is alone sufficient to support the conclusion that a covenant
restricting
the employee from going to work for a direct competitor is reason7
able.
In an action for injunctive relief, it is enough, therefore, to show that the
covenant has been breached. The employer need not go the additional step and
show that not only has it been breached but that, as a result of the breach, trade

enjoin the disclosure or use of a trade secret until its illegal use is eminent [sic] or
until it has already occurred. By that time, much of the damage may be done.
Third, even if a clearly illegal use of the trade secret by a former employee can be
shown, most courts will not enjoin that person from working for the competition on/
that basis. Instead, they will merely enjoin future disclosure of the trade secret. Yet.
policing the former employee's compliance with that injunction will be difficult.
Finally, even if the employee does not maliciously attempt to use his former
employer's trade secrets in the new employer's workplace, avoiding this use can be
difficult It would be difficult for the employee to guard the trade secret of the
former employer and be effective for the new employer....
In order to avoid these problems, many employers ask their employees to sign
non-competition agreements. These agreements prevent an employee from working
with the competition within a limited geographic range of the former employer and
for a limited time. As seen above, Virginia courts will only enforce these agreements if they are reasonable. Yet, when they are valid, they make the guarding of
a trade secret easier since they remove the opportunity for the former employee to
pass on the trade secret to the competition, either malevolently or benevolently. This
does not supplant the need for law protecting trade secrets. Non-competition
agreements cannot prevent disclosure anywhere in the world and until the end of
time, for they would be held unreasonable. Instead, a non-competition agreement
will merely prevent the illegal use of a trade secret next door in the near future,
where the use might do the most damage.
Id. at 561-62. Accord AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1987) (111. law);
Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (8th Cir. 1978) (Minn. law); see also
Hutter, Drafting Enforceable Employee Non-Competition Agreements to Protect Confidential Business
Information:A Lawyer's PracticalApproach to the Case Law, 45 ALB. L. REv. 311, 313-17 (1981).
2 See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ill. law); Modem
Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1265-69 (8th Cir. 1978) (Minn. law). Proof of the
employee's knowledge of or access to trade secrets establishes, afortiori,that the employer will sustain
irreparable harm if the covenant is not enforced. E.g., Levine v. Beckman, 48 Ohio App. 3d 24, 27-28,
548 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1988). There is no basis for imposing on the employer the burden of demonstrating
that the employee had access to extraordinarily sensitive confidential information before enforcing a
noncompetition covenant The test of reasonableness is not whether the new employer's access to
information will deal a mortal blow to the former employer. The court in Frank, Seringer & Chaney, Inc.
v. Jesko, No. 89CA004577, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1989) (1989 WL 147951 (Ohio App.)),
mistakenly required the former employer to show that the employee, an accountant, possessed "trade
secrets or confidential information... beyond that which was ordinary and customary in the accounting
practice....
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secrets or confidential information have been or are about to be put to use or
disclosed by the employee.248 Any such additional requirement of proof would
effectively defeat the purpose for which a restrictive covenant is intended -- to
prevent compromise of an employer's trade secrets.
Customer Contacts. The Ohio courts have also readily recognized an
employer's interest in protecting the goodwill an employer may develop through
customer contacts. Protection of this interest was the primary object of the
covenant in Briggs v. Butler,249 and, as already discussed above, 250 the Ohio
Supreme Court held reasonable a restriction intended to protect this interest. The
court of appeals for Cuyahoga County had earlier described, in FederalSanitation
Co. v. Frankel,25 ' why an employer has a legitimate interest in preventing a
former employee from exploiting his customer contacts to the employer's
detriment:
"It is clear that if the nature of the employment is such as will
bring the employee in personal contact with the patrons or
customers of the employer, who enable him to acquire valuable
information as to the nature and character of the business and the
names and requirements of the patrons or customers, enabling
him, by engaging in a competing business in his own behalf, or
for another, to take advantage of such knowledge of or acquaintance with the patrons or customers of his former employer, and
thereby gain an unfair advantage, equity will interfere on behalf
of the employer and restrain the breach of a negative covenant
not to engage in such competing business, either for himself or
for another, providing the covenant does not offend against the
rule that as to the time during which the restraint is imposed, or
as to the territory it embraces, it shall be no greater than is
reasonably necessary to secure the protection of the business or
'252
good will of the employer.

u See Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104 Ohio App. 8,13-14, 146 N.E.2d 447,451 (1957); Jewel
Tea Co. v. Wilson, 41 Ohio Cir. Dec. 280, 281 (Cir. CL 1912).

24140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942).
2"

See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.

2"34 Ohio App. 331, 171 N.E. 339 (1929).
252 Id. at

334, 171 N.E. at 340, quoting Annot., Validity and Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in

Contracts of Employment, 9 A.LR. 1450, 1468-69 (1920).
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Restrictive covenants have routinely been enforced against former

253
salesmen and other employees on this basis.

Other Interests.

The Ohio courts have recognized a range of other

interests that may justify a noncompetition covenant. If the services of the
employee are "unique", it may be reasonable for the employer to secure a promise
that the employee will not take those services to a direct competitor. Television
or radio personalities, for example, may fall within this category of "unique"
employee. M Where it has been found that the employee's services are unique,
noncompetition covenants have been enforced.255
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Briggs v. Butler,256 however, there
is no need to show that the employee's services are unique to obtain injunctive
relief to enforce a noncompetition covenant. 257 Any analysis that implies that

E.g., Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 8-9. 565 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1991); Parma
Int'l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89 CA004573, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio CL App. February 7, 1990) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file); Myers Servs., Inc. v. Costello, No. CA-917, slip op. at 11 (Ohio CL App. June 26,
1989) (1989 WL 76464 (Ohio App.)); Shury v. Rocco, No. 56214, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. March
30, 1989) (1989 WL 30538 (Ohio App.)); Arthur Young & Co. v. Kelly, No. 87AP-800, slip op. at 4-5
(Ohio Ct. App. April 28, 1988) (1988 WL 41069 (Ohio App.)); Trim-Line of Toledo, Inc. v. Carroll, C.A.
No. L-86-176, slip op. at 2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. January 23, 1987) (1987 WL 5557 (Ohio App.)), modified,
(Ohio CL App. February 25, 1987) (1987 WL 7056 (Ohio App.)); Thompson's Supply Co. v. Vivio, No.
9562, slip op. at 5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. September 26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Columbus
Medical Equip. Co. v. Watters, 13 Ohio App. 3d 149, 151, 468 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1983); Kaeser v.
Adamson, No. 773, slip op. at 5 (Ohio CL App. December 14, 1982) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file);
Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104 Ohio App. 8, 11-13, 146 N.E.2d 447, 450-51 (1957); Toulrnin
v. Becker, 124 N.E.2d 778, 784 (Ohio CL App. 1954); Federal Sanitation Co. v. Frankel, 34 Ohio App.
331, 334, 171 N.E. 339, 340 (1929); Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Hague, 25 Ohio App. 100, 107, 157
N.E. 393, 395 (1927); Individual Damp Wash Laundry Co. v. Meyers, 26 Ohio L Abs. 142, 143-44 (C.P.
1938). Accord Barnes Group, Inc. v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454, 460-61 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Ohio law);
Keller v. Graphic Sys. of Akron, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1012-13 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
For a thoughtful discussion of the former employee's "customer contact" as a legitimate interest
to be protected and the various settings in which it can arise, see generally Arthur Murray Dance Studios
of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witten, 105 N.E.2d 685, 705-09 (C.P. 1952).
23

25 See Clooney v. WCPO Television Div., 35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 127-28, 300 N.E.2d 256, 258 (1973);
Skyland Broadcasting Corp. v. Hamby, 141 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
See, e.g., Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89 CA004573, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio CL App. February 7,
1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Clooney v. WCPO Television Div., 35 Ohio App. 2d 124, 12728, 300 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1973); Skyland Broadcasting Corp. v. Hamby, 141 N.E.2d 783, 784-85 (Ohio

C.P. 1957).
2'6140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757 (1942).
2 7 1d. at 510-11, 45 N.E.2d at 763. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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proof of uniqueness is a condition precedent to enforcement directly conflicts with
Briggs v. Butler.25
An employer's investment in training an employee has repeatedly been

recognized as a justification for imposing a noncompetition covenant. The Ohio
259
Supreme Court did so explicitly in Rogers v. Runfola & Associates, Inc.
Where the employer has been able to show that it would create an unfair

advantage for the employee to give a direct competitor the benefit of the
specialized training invested in the employee by the employer, it has been held

that the former employer's interest is sufficient to make the restriction reasonable.

6

In other cases, the courts have considered the employer's investment

in training as one of the circumstances justifying enforcement of a covenant, even
if not the sole justification.2 6'

It is axiomatic that the general knowledge and experience acquired by an
employee during the course of employment do not constitute trade secrets of the
employer.262 An employer is not, as a general proposition, free to bar an
employee from the use of this general knowledge and experience on behalf of a

new employer:

' Enforcement was erroneously denied in WKBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Levin, No. 88 C.A. 175, slip op.
at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 1989) (1989 WL 49497 (Ohio App.)), because the employer had failed to
show that the services of the former employee were extraordinary, peculiar or unique. Enforcement was
granted in Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89 CA004573, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. February 7, 1990)
(LEXS, States library, Ohio file), because it had been found that the employee's services were unique.
The court in Parma Intl correctly recognized that, under New York law, a non-competition covenant will
be enforced to protect the employer from the "special harm" that may be caused by his competitor gaining
the services of a unique employee. American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 403, 420
N.E.2d 363, 367, 438 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (1981). Uniqueness of the employee's services constitutes, at
best, an alternate basis for finding a covenant to be reasonable, and controlling Ohio law does not conflict
with New York law on this proposition.
2. 57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 8-9, 565 N.E.2d 540, 545 (1991).
260See, e.g., Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Herman, No. 54243, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio CL App. February 16, 1989)
(1989 WL 12928 (Ohio App.)); Bradley v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., No. C-790508, slip op. at 4-5
(Ohio CL App. January 14, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
26' See, e.g., Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 8-9, 565 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1991)
(training of employees and employees' customer contacts); Trim-Line of Toledo, Inc. v. Carroll, C.A. No.
L-86-176, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct App. January 23, 1987), (1987 WL 5557 (Ohio App.)), modified, (Ohio
Ct. App. February 25, 1987) (1987 WL 7056 (Ohio App.)); Thompson's Supply Co. v. Vivio, No. 9562
slip op. at 4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. September 26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Harry Livingston,
Inc. v. Stern, 69 Ohio App. 105, 107-08, 43 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1941); Patterson Int'l Corp. v. Herrin, 25
Ohio Misc. 79, 85-86, 264 N.E.2d 361, 364-65 (C.P. 1970). Accord, e.g., Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Cornutt, 907 F.2d 1085, 1087-88 (11th Cir. 1990) (Ala. law).
'a E.g., GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 768 (S.D. Ohio 1969, Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N &
D Machining Serv., Inc., 24 Ohio St. 3d 41, 46, 492 N.E.2d 814, 817 (1986).
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A former employee can use to his own advantage all the skills
and knowledge of common use in the trade that he acquires
during his employment. A person who enters employment as an
apprentice and leaves it as a master cannot be enjoined from
using his enhanced skills and knowledge in future employment.
He can be enjoined only from developing or using the unique and
advantageous materials and processes revealed to him in a

confidential employer-employee
relationship under substantial
263
measures of security.
Nonetheless, there is no analytical bar under the ancillary restraint
doctrine to enforcement of a noncompetition covenant to prevent an employee
from conferring on a direct competitor the former employer's substantial
investment in specialized training. Even though the information imparted may not
rise to the level of trade secrets or confidential information and may, indeed, be
known in the trade, it may nonetheless be reasonable to enforce a restrictive

covenant to prevent, for example, a newly-trained employee from going to work

for a direct competitor.2 6 In any event, the Ohio Supreme Court's clear
recognition in Rogers v. Runfola & Associates, Inc. of the employer's investment
in training as a protectable interest effectively removes from debate the propriety

of protection of this interest.
The foregoing are the employer interests that have repeatedly been the
subject of noncompetition covenants.2 65 Experience suggests that these are the

23 Wiebold Studio, Inc. v. Old World Restorations, Inc., 19 Ohio App. 3d 246, 248, 484 N.E.2d 290, 284

(1985). See generally Collin, supra note 243, at 592-99.
2'
On the need to protect the employer's investment in training regardless of the confidentiality of the
information imparted to the employee, see generally Comment, supra note 231, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. at
716-18.

Blake observed that efforts to enforce noncompetition covenants to protect an employer's investment
in the training of an employee had almost invariably proved futile unless the employer could show that
it was confidential or otherwise protectable information that had been imparted to the employee during
the training. See Blake, supra note 6, at 651-53. The RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS (1932) recognized
at Section 516(0 that an employee noncompetition covenant would be reasonable, and therefore
enforceable, if limited to such a territory and duration "as may be reasonably necessary for the protection
of the employer". Comment h to Section 516(f) specifically noted that any such promise would not
ordinarily be enforced against a former employee "so as to preclude him from exercising skill and
knowledge acquired in his employer's business" unless trade secrets or customer lists of the former
employer were the subject of protection. The more recent case law does not bear out this view.
20

For a justification for the protection of the employer's investment in training even though the
information imparted to the employee may not constitute trade secrets or confidential information, see
Comment, supra note 231, 52 U. CHL L. REV. at 716-18. It has recently been held by an intermediate
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interests most likely to justify protection by way of a restrictive covenant, but the
ancillary restraint doctrine is sufficiently elastic to leave open the possibility that
other interests may also be deserving of protection.26
2.

Hardship to Employee.

Another criterion of reasonableness is the degree of hardship the covenant

imposes on the employee. This necessarily emerges from the third branch of the
a restrictive covenant approved by the Ohio Supreme
test for the enforceability2of
67
Court in Lange v. Werk:

... 1. That the restraint is partial; 2. That it is founded upon a
valuable consideration; and 3. That it is reasonable and not
oppressive.268

How important is hardship to the employee in evaluating reasonableness? Simply
stated, it is not dispositive, and hardship will not defeat enforcement of an

otherwise reasonable restraint.
The Ohio Supreme Court observed in Grasselli v. Lowden 69 that

reasonableness is not measured by reference to a restraint's "effect upon the rights
and interests of the covenantor" but rather upon its effect upon the rights of the
covenantee and the rights and interests of the public.27 ° Hardship to the

covenantor was, thus, not a separate focus of inquiry. The test of reasonableness
was, instead, whether the restraint was no broader than necessary to protect the

Florida appellate court that only "extraordinary" training by the employer is protectable. See Hapney v.
Central Garage, Inc., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCl) 1 69,322 at 65,243 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991). As Rogers v.
Runfola & Assocs., Inc. makes clear, Ohio has no such requirement.
2 6
The general case law reflects a doctrinal rigidity that has, largely, confined the protectable employer's
interests to trade secrets or confidential business information and the employer's relationships with its
customers. See generally Blake, supra note 6, at 653-74; Carpenter, supra note 13, at 268-69; Handler
& Lazaroff, supra note 140, at 729. In commenting on the enforceability of employment noncompetition
covenants, the reporter to the RESTATEMENr OF CONTRAS (1932) observed that covenants could be
enforced only to prevent the use of trade secrets or customer lists or only if the services of the employee
were unique. I& § 516(f), comment h. The ancillary restraint doctrine does not mandate this fixation on
trade secrets and customer contacts, and the Ohio courts properly recognize a range of other interests.
See notes 254-65 supra and accompanying text.
w 2 Ohio St. 520 (1853).
Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
2- 11 Ohio St. 349 (1860).
2*0 Id. at 357. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
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legitimate interests of the covenantee. If it was broader than those interests, then
it was 271"oppressive" and, consequently, interfered with the interests of the
public.
The Ohio Supreme Court in later decisions clearly intended no departure
from this analysis, emphasizing in Briggs v. Butler,272 for example, that its
holding on the enforceability of the noncompetition covenant before it was totally
consistent with earlier decisions by the court. Nonetheless, the court explained,
in enforcing the covenant, that it was "not unreasonably restrictive upon the rights
of the employee".273 By the time it decided Raimonde v. Van Vlerah,274 the
court had, through inadvertence rather than analysis, insinuated hardship into the
original Lange v. Werk reasonableness calculus:
A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his
former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable
if it is no greater than is required for the protection of the
hardshipon the employee, and
employer, does not impose undue
275
is not injurious to the public.

Even if hardship to the employee is separately evaluated, as this
formulation implies, it should not be viewed in isolation. There is no suggestion
in Raimonde that any departure was intended from the Grasselli directive that
reasonableness is not measured by a restraint's "effect upon the rights and interest
of the covenantor".2 76 Viewing hardship in isolation would mean that an
otherwise reasonable covenant could not be enforced if inconvenience to the
employee were of a sufficient magnitude. This would have the effect of
overriding all employer interests, no matter how certain or paramount, and it
could cause exactly the unfair competition that ancillary restraints are intended to
27 In following the three-part test of enforceability used in Lange v. Werk, the Grassellicourt repeated

that the restraint must be reasonable and "not oppressive". 11 Ohio St. 349, 357 (1860). The reference
to "oppressive" was borrowed directly by the court from the formulation of reasonableness in Homer v.
Graves, 7 Bingham 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (1831):
Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party, can be of no benefit to
either, it can only be oppressive; and if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable.
Whatever is injurious to the interest of the public is void, on the grounds of public policy.
Id. at 743, 131 Eng. Rep. at 287. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for the full quote.
272 140 Ohio St. 499, 511, 45 N.E.2d 757, 763 (1942).
273 Id.
274 42

Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).

Id. at 26, 325 N.E.2d at 547 (emphasis added).
276Grasselli v. Lowden, 11 Ohio St. 349, 357 (1860).
27
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foreclose. Indeed, to evaluate reasonableness by reference to employee hardship
alone would put the unscrupulous competitor in the enviable position of being
able to nullify another firm's noncompetition covenants merely by selectively
hiring those employees who would experience the greatest personal hardship from
enforcement.
Consistently with the analytical flexibility inherent in the ancillary
restraint doctrine, the Ohio courts have viewed hardship to the employee as
something less than a dispositive circumstance. The Supreme Court's decision
in Rogers v. Runfola & Associates, Inc.2 77 proves the point. After acknowledging that the covenants under review would, if enforced, impose "excessive

hardship" on the former employees,278 the court advanced to consider what
restrictions should nonetheless be enforced against the employees. Taking into
protection, the
account the business interests of the former employer warranting
279
court modified the covenants and enforced them in part.

One measure of hardship to the employee is the availability of other
employment if the covenant is enforced. The fact that an employee can, by

reason of his training and experience, seek or accept employment with a firm
other than a direct competitor has repeatedly been deemed to be convincing

evidence that a covenant is not unreasonable. 8 ° No Ohio decisions have been
found in which an employee's inability to find satisfactory alternative employment
28
has, itself, foreclosed enforcement of an otherwise reasonable covenant. '
27

57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 565 N.E.2d 540 (1991).

2JId. at 8, 565 N.E.2d at 544. The majority was unmoved by the dissent's eloquent plea for mercy. The

dissent stressed that enforcement of the covenants, even partially, would cause "particularly onerous"
hardship to the employees. Id. at 10, 565 N.E.2d at 545.
' Id. at 9, 565 N.E.2d at 544.

29

"0 See, e.g., Myers Servs., Inc. v. Costello No. CA-917, slip op. at 8 (Ohio CL App. June 26, 1989) (1989
WL 76464 (Ohio App.)); Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Herman, No. 54243, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. February
16, 1989) (1989 WL 12928 (Ohio App.)); Ganguly v. Mead Digital Sys., No. 8225, slip op. at 6 (Ohio
CL App. September 20, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Columbus Medical Equip. Co. v.
Watters, 13 Ohio App.3d 149, 152, 468 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1983); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104
Ohio App. 8, 12, 146 N.E.2d 447, 450 (1957). Accord Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 27576 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The court of appeals in Marietta Therapy Assocs., Inc. v. Boles, No. 88-CA-35
(Ohio CL App. December 20, 1989) (1989 WL 159018 (Ohio App.)), rejected a former employee's
attempt to add "fairness" as a measure of enforceability. Noting that undue hardship to the employee had
properly been taken into account by the trial court, the court of appeals held that there was no separate
criterion of fairness to the employee that also should have been considered. Id. slip op. at 3.
2s' A covenant barring an employee from working anywhere in the world in a business the same as or
similar to that of his former employer was deemed unreasonable in Columbus Midway, Inc. v. Holtz, No,
3378, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1988) (1988 WL 142304 (Ohio App.)). The employee was
barred from working in the trash compactor parts business anywhere, and the court of appeals found no
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In addition to the availability of alternative employment, hardship to the
employee can be evaluated by reference to the severity of sanctions for breach
of the noncompetition covenant.2 The courts typically consider the sanction
as an integral part of the reasonableness evaluation, but it can better be considered

under the heading of employee hardship.

Forfeiture of insurance renewal

commissions has, for example, not been deemed unreasonable.2 3
forfeiture of stock rights has not been deemed unreasonable, 2" and
of pension rights has been held not to impose an undue hardship or be
unreasonable. 28 5 Although there is no reason why liquidated damages

Likewise,
forfeiture
otherwise
cannot be

awarded in the appropriate case for breach of a noncompetition covenant, 2 6 it

error in the trial court's determination that the restraint thereby imposed an undue hardship on the
employee. Hardship was caused by the overbreadth of the covenant, which was itself a basis for holding
the restriction unreasonable. To the same effect, see Williams v. Hobbs, 9 Ohio App. 3d 331, 333, 460
N.E.2d 287, 290 (1983).
Section 188(1) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) provides that an ancillary
restraint may be unreasonable if it is broader than needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interests
or if the promisee's need is outweighed by hardship to the promisor and likely injury to the public. The
reporter observes that the harm to the employee may be excessive if the restraint limits his personal
freedom by preventing him from earning his livelihood if he quits. Id. § 188, comment c. This provision
of the Restatement has been strenuously, and correctly, criticized as suggesting that employee hardship
can, standing alone, block enforcement of an otherwise reasonable restraint. See Handler & Lazaroff,
supra note 140, at 73948.
22
Conversely, breach by the employer of the employment contract by wrongful termination or otherwise
will bar any enforcement of a restrictive covenant See, e.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. O'Brien, 591 F.Supp.
454, 461-63 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Ohio law; affirmative defense waived by contract); Elevator Co. v. Kendall,
27 Ohio L. Rep. 679, 681-82 (Ct. App. 1928) (enforcement denied); Jewel Tea Co. v. Wilson, 41 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 280, 282 (Ct App. 1912) (enforcement denied).
23 E.g., Gaflikov v. E.M. Ellman & Assoc., Inc., No. 81AP-1028 slip op. at 4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. March
10, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Harvest Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Walker, No. CA-2136 slip op.
at 3 (Ohio Ct App. October 11, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Bradley v. Pennsylvania Life
Ins. Co., No. C-7905058 slip op. at 3-5 (Ohio Ct. App. January 14, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio
file).
E.g., Knapp v. S. Jarvis Adams Co., 135 F. 1008, 1012-14 (6th Cir. 1905) (Ohio parties).
E.g., Wolcott v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1533, 1541 (S.D. Ohio 1987), affdinpart
& rev'd in part on other grounds, 884 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1989) (Ohio law); Keller v. Graphic Sys. of
Akron, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (same); Kezdi v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 35683,
slip op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. August 11, 1977) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file). But see Snarr v. Picker
Corp., 29 Ohio App. 3d 254, 256-57, 504 N.E.2d 1168, 1171-72 (1985) (employer demonstrated no
interest needing protection).
2

See, e.g., Grasselli v. Lowden, 11 Ohio St. 349, 361-62 (1860) (restriction incident to sale of business);
Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 520, 533-35 (1853) (same).
2"
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has been held that liquidated damages may make unreasonable an otherwise
enforceable employee noncompetition covenant.287
3.

Public Interest.

As the Ohio Supreme Court explained in Grasselliv. Lowden,28 8 if a
restraint is no broader than needed to protect the legitimate interests of the
covenantee, it is necessarily consistent with, and has no adverse effect upon, the
public interest.289 By necessary implication, it is in the public interest to

enforce a covenant to the extent necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the
covenantee290

There is no need to look any further to identify the public interest.
Although, in common with employee hardship, this interest was separately
identified by the court in Raimonde v. Van Vlerah2' 9 as one element of the
tripartite test for evaluating the reasonableness of an employee noncompetition
covenant, 292 separate consideration of the public interest is unwarranted.
Isolation of public interest as an independent criterion of reasonableness would
suggest that enforcement of an otherwise reasonable covenant could be barred if
inconsistent with the public interest. The proposition is self-contradictory since
of a properly limited restrictive covenant is, ipso facto, in the public
enforcement
293
interest.

E.g., Menter & Rosenbloom Co. v. Gray, Hosea's Reports 95,98-100 (Super. Ct. 1899). Cf. Cad Cam,
Inc. v. Underwood, 36 Ohio App. 3d 90, 521 N.E.2d 498 (1987) (liquidated damages clause was an
unenforceable penalty and injunctive relief not available because restraint was unreasonable). Whether
enforcement of a liquidated damages provision would be reasonable is directly related to whether the
scope of the covenant is broader than that reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the
covenantee. In Cad Cam, the court of appeals concluded that the liquidated damages provision was in
fact a penalty clause, imposing damages entirely disproportionate to any actual injury that might be
suffered by the former employer from the employee's departure and employment by a direct competitor.
36 Ohio App. 3d at 93-94, 521 N.E.2d at 501-02.
2u I Ohio St. 349 (1860).
23

2

Id. at 357-58.

2" See generally Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 140, at 718-27, 731-39.
29342 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).
292 Id. at 26, 325 N.E.2d at 547. See supra note 275 for the text of the test.

It has been held that it would not be in the public interest to enforce a noncompetition covenant against
a radiologist where to do so would have prevented him from working at one of the few osteopathic
hospitals in Franklin County in which he could practice his specialty. Williams v. Hobbs, 9 Ohio App.
3d 331, 333, 460 N.E.2d 287, 290 (1983). Evaluation of the public interest was not dispositive, for the
trial court had also found that the restrictive covenant was unreasonable because greater than that required
for protection of the radiologist's former employer. Id. To the same effect, see Northwest Ohio
2
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Scope of the Restraint.

In evaluating whether a restriction is no broader than that needed to
protect the legitimate interests of the covenantee, it is necessary in every case to
look at geographic extent and duration. Even if the restraint is justified by the

need to protect the employer's interests, it is enforceable only to a degree,
temporally and geographically, appropriate for protection of those interests.
Before addressing the geographic and temporal scope of restraints,

however, it may be profitable to consider another aspect of scope that bears
directly upon reasonableness: the immediacy of competitive harm. The more
remote the prospect of competitive harm from the employee's new job, the less
likely a restraint will be found to be reasonable. A covenant restricting an
employee from accepting work with a new employer engaged in the "same or
similar" business as the former employer is less likely to be enforced, for
example, than a covenant restricting the employee from accepting employment in
a position directly competitive with the position he had occupied in his former

employment 294 Likewise, a covenant restricting an employee from working for
a company engaged in any activity competitive with an activity of the former
employer could be unreasonable if the employee's new responsibilities were not
competitive with those in which he had been engaged on behalf of his former
employer.

Anesthesia Servs., Inc. v. Lymanstall, No. 7-87-4, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. August 4, 1989) (1989 WL
87027 (Ohio App.)) (covenant not enforced against anesthetist because it was broader than necessary for
protection of former employer, caused undue hardship to the anesthetist and was injurious to the public).
To the extent the formulation of the ancillary restraint doctrine in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS (1981) suggests that the public interest may constitute a separate, independent basis for
denying enforcement of an otherwise reasonable covenant, id. § 188(1)(b), it has properly been criticized
as an unwarranted departure from the case law. See Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 140, at 731-39. The
single exception may be the prohibition against enforcement, on public policy grounds and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, of noncompetition covenants against lawyers. See, e.g., Cohen v. Lord, Day
& Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 101, 550 N.E.2d 410, 413, 551 N.Y.S. 2d 157, 160 (1989).
294See, e.g., Die-Gem Co. v. Miller, No. 13806, slip op. at 2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. March 1. 1989) (1989 WL
16889 (Ohio App.)) (restriction modified to bar employee from selling the three categories of products
comprising eighty percent of former employer's sales). Enforceability does not turn upon proof that the
employee is doing exactly the same work in the new position as in the former. Unfair competition can
occur even though job responsibilities may differ in the new employment, and its prevention is properly
the subject of a noncompetition covenant To the extent that the court in WKBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
Levin, No. 88 C.A. 175, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5, 1989) (1989 WL 49497 (Ohio App.)),
declined to enforce a covenant because the employee did not "seek to perform precisely the same work",
it was mistaken.
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An employee moving from one division of a large corporation to a noncompetitive division of a second corporation does not, under normal circumstances, pose any threat of unfair competition to the former employer.295 The
situation would be different, of course, if there were some prospect that the
employee, even though engaged in a non-competitive activity for the new
employer, would be in a position, or might otherwise have the incentive, to
compromise the former employer's trade secrets, know-how, customer contacts
or other interests by disclosing information or otherwise assisting the new
employer in its competitive efforts against his former employer.
Geographic Scope. Where a covenant had no geographic restriction
specified, it had universally been held that it was unenforceable and void. 296
This is no longer true, as the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Raimonde v. Van
Vlerah29' permits a court to enforce a covenant to the extent reasonable. Covenants can now be enforced even though they may be silent as to geographic
29 9 that a
scope.29
Oblivious to the holding of Luflin Rule Co. v. Fringeli
restraint extending beyond the State of Ohio would be deemed to be a general
restraint and therefore void and unenforceable, both lower Ohio courts and federal
courts have, since Raimonde, enforced employment restrictions of world-wide
scope" or covering Canada, United States and Western Europe, 1 the United
States alone 3° or having no geographic limitations whatsoever.30 3 It was held
in Hubman Supply Co. v. Irvin30 4 that Lufiin Rule foreclosed enforcement of

See generally Blake, supra note 6, at 676-77; Hutter, supra note 246, at 335; Kales, supra note 103,
at 196-97.
' E.g., Evans v. Duracote Corp., 13 Ohio App. 2d 63, 65-66, 233 N.E.2d 873, 875 (1968); Segal v.
Fleischer, 93 Ohio App. 315, 319, 113 N.E.2d 608, 611 (1952); Emler v. Ferne, 23 Ohio App. 218, 223,

155 N.E. 496, 497 (1926).
29742 Ohio St. 2d 21, 25-26, 325 N.E.2d 544, 547 (1975).
2" E.g., Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89 CA004573, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App. February 7, 1990)
(LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (covenant modified to provide for 25-mile radius). But see Columbus
Midway, Inc. v. Holtz, No. 3378, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1988) (1988 WL 142304 (Ohio
App.)) (world-wide restraint unreasonable; reformation rejected).
2"957 Ohio St. 596, 603-04, 49 N.E. 1030, 1033 (1898). See supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
30 Ganguly v. Mead Digital Sys., No. 8225, slip op. at 4-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1984) (LEXIS, States

library, Ohio file).
30 Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674 F.2d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982) (Ohio law).
m Duracote Corp. v. Ryan, No. 1247, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. April 15, 1983) (LEXIS, States library,
Ohio file).
3 Nordson Corp. v. Hollingsworth, 231 U.S.P.Q. 388, 391-92 (D.S.C. 1986) (Ohio law); Premix, Inc.
v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 275 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (Ohio law).
'0 119 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio C.P. 1953).
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any covenant having a scope beyond the State of Ohio, 0 5 but this may be the

only decision in which the implications of Lufkin Rule have been accurately
understood.306
Where Ohio courts have focused on the geographic extent of the

employer's business, they have encountered no difficulty enforcing covenants of
multi-state scope.'
As a general proposition, a restraint is reasonable in
geographic scope if it is coextensive with the geographic scope of the covenantee's business3' or if it is no broader than the tcrritory assigned to a
salesman or manager."9 In the case of research and development personnel,
whose activities are not confined to any particular geographic segment of a
business, restrictions at least coextensive with the market area of the employer's

business are appropriate.310

Id. at 154-55 (enforcement denied).
number of decisions have enforced restrictive covenants with Ohio as their geographic extent, but
all for reasons unrelated to the holding of Luflin Rule. See, e.g., Columbus Medical Equip. Co. v.
Watters, 13 Ohio App. 3d 149, 151-52, 468 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1983); Bradley v. Pennsylvania Life Ins.
Co., No. C-790508, slip op. at 3-5 (Ohio CL App. Jan. 14, 1981) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file);
Conforming Matrix Corp. V. Faber, 104 Ohio App. 8, 14, 146 N.E.2d 447 (1957).
30 E.g., Toulmin v. Becker, 124 N.E.2d 778,783-84 (Ohio Ct App. 1954) (Ohio and Michigan); Federal
Sanitation Co. v. Frankel, 34 Ohio App. 331, 333, 171 N.E. 339, 340 (1929) (Ohio and Michigan);
Patterson Int'l Corp. v. Herrin, 25 Ohio Misc. 79, 85-86, 264 N.E.2d 361, 363-64 (C.P. 1970) (45 states).
m E.g., Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403 406-07, 200 N.E.2d 297, 299-300 (1964);
Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 510-11, 45 N.E.2d 757, 763 (1942); Myers Servs., Inc. v. Costello,
No. CA-917, slip op. at 4, 10-11 (Ohio Ct App. June 26, 1989) (1989 WL 76464 (Ohio App.)); Shury
v. Rocco, No. 56214, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio CL App. March 30, 1989) (1989 WL 30538 (Ohio App.));
Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Herman, No. 54243, slip op. at 4 (Ohio CL App. Feb. 16, 1989) (1989 WL 12928
(Ohio App.)); Clooney v. WCPO Television Div., 35 Ohio App.2d 124, 128, 300 N.E.2d 256, 258-59
(1973) (broadcasting range of television station). See also E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler, 12 Ohio
App. 2d 16, 21-23, 230 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1967) (no enforcement because restraint exceeded geographic
scope of business).
3m E.g., Die-Gem Co. v. Miller, No. 13806, slip op. at 3 (Ohio CLt App. March 1, 1989) (1989 WL 16889
(Ohio App.)) (salesman); Thompson's Supply Co. v. Vivio, No. 9562, slip op. at 6 (Ohio CL App. Sep.
26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (salesman); Duracote Corp. v. Ryan, No. 1247, slip op. at 3-4
(Ohio CL App. April 15, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (salesman); Harry Livingston, Inc. v.
Stem, 69 Ohio App. 105, 107-08, 43 N.E.2d 302, 303-04 (1941) (store manager).
310 E.g., Nordson Corp. v. Plasschaert, 674 F.2d 1371, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982) (Ohio law) (covenant
enforced to include United States, Canada and Western Europe); Ganguly v. Mead Digital Sys., No. 8225,
slip op. at 4-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 20, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (world-wide enforcement).
30

306 A
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The more narrowly focused a restriction, the more readily it will be
deemed to be reasonable, and restrictions that merely limit an employee from
soliciting his former employer's customers are routinely enforced. 3 1
Duration. In evaluating reasonableness of duration, a wide range of

considerations may be taken into account,31 2 but the Ohio decisions have,
typically, approved as reasonable various periods of restriction without any
discussion of the basis for doing so. This approach is consistent with that taken
in the decisions enforcing restrictive covenants incident to the sale of business.
As suggested above, 1 3 by the time the courts get to this stage in their analysis,
their attention span is usually exhausted.
The most that can be found in the Ohio decisions is some suggestion that
one measure of reasonable duration is the length of time it would take to hire and
train a replacement employee. 3 4 Another measure of reasonable duration may
be the time it would take a competitor to independently develop, through reverseengineering or otherwise, trade secrets
or confidential information sought to be
31 5
protected by a restrictive covenant.
The lack of specific guidance on evaluating duration leaves with the
courts a great deal of flexibility in determining reasonableness, even to the point
of implying a reasonable time for the restriction where the agreement is totally
silent as to duration.31 6 Since Raimonde, the courts have routinely modified
contractual provisions for the purpose of arriving at a duration that is, in the

3" E.g., Barnes Group, Inc. v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454, 460 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Ohio law); Extine v.
Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 406-07, 200 N.E.2d 297, 299-300 (1964); Patterson Int'l
Corp. v. Herrin, 25 Ohio Misc. 79, 82, 85-86, 264 N.E.2d 361, 363-64 (C.P. 1970); Individual Damp
Wash Laundry Co. v. Meyers, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 142, 143-44 (C.P. 1938); White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28
Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 172, 173, 179 (C.P. 1930); Langdon v. Houck, 27 Ohio Dec. 150, 151-52 (C.P. 1912).
312 See generally Blake, supra note 6, at 677-78; Note, supra note 142, at 170-73 (restrictive
covenants generally).
3'3 See supra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
314 See, e.g., Roberts Express, Inc. v. Bauman, No. L-89-197, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App. April 20, 1990)
(1990 WL 48113 (Ohio App.)); Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89CA004573, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Feb. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Trim-Line of Toledo, Inc. v. Carroll, No. L-86-176, slip
op. at 2-3 (Ohio CL App. Feb. 25, 1987) (1987 WL 7056 (Ohio App.)).
315See, e.g., A. L Laboratories, Inc. v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 384 (8th Cir. 1986) (Mo. law),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1007 (1987); Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machinery Serv., Inc., 24 Ohio St.
3d 41, 49-50, 492 N.E.2d 814, 821 (1986) (Wright, L, concurring in part, dissenting in part). See
generally M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 7.0213][b] (1987).
"6 See Garlikov v. E.M. Ellman & Assoc., Inc., No. 81AP-1028, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. App. March 10,

1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
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court's view, reasonable.317 Regardless of the analysis, or lack of it, reflected
31
in the opinions, courts have enforced covenants under Ohio law for one year, 1
18-months, 319 two years320 or longer.32 In the event of successful enforce-

ment of a covenant by the former employer, duration is measured from the entry
of final judgment after any appeals, not from the date of termination of
employment'3 2

3l1See, e.g., Die-Gem Co. v. Miller, No. 13806, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct App. March 1, 1989) (1989 WL

16889 (Ohio App.)) (five-year restriction reduced to one year); Trim-Line of Toledo, Inc. v. Carroll, No.
L-86-176, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1987) (1987 WL 7056 (Ohio App.)) (two-year restriction
reduced to one year).
3" Parma Int'l, Inc. v. Bartos, No. 89CA004573, slip op. at 4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1990) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file); Die-Gem Co. v. Miller, No. 13806, slip op. at 3 (Ohio Ct. App. March 1, 1989) (1989
WL 16889 (Ohio App.)); Trim-Line of Toledo, Inc. v. Carroll, No. L-86-176, slip op. at 3 (Ohio CL App.
Feb. 25, 1987) (1987 WL 7056 (Ohio App.)); Clooney v. WCPO Television Div., 35 Ohio App. 2d 124,
128, 300 N.E.2d 256, 257, 259 (1973); Skyland Broadcasting Corp. v. Hamby, 141 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ohio
C.P. 1957) (eight months); Individual Damp Wash Laundry Co. v. Meyers, 16 Ohio L Abs. 142, 143-44
(C.P. 1938); White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 172, 173, 179 (C.P. 1930).
3'9Patterson Int'l Corp. v. Herrin, 25 Ohio Misc. 79, 85, 264 N.E.2d 361, 364 (C.P. 1970).
Nordson Corp. v. Hollingsworth, 231 U.S.P.Q. 388, 391-92 (D.S.C. 1986) (Ohio law); Barnes Group,
Inc. v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454, 460 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Ohio law); Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F.
Supp. 269, 275 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Extine v. Williamson Midwest, Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 406-07, 200
N.E.2d 297, 299-300 (1964); Myers Servs., Inc. v. Costello, No. CA-917, slip op. at 4, 11 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 26, 1989) (1989 WL 76464 (Ohio App.)); Shury v. Rocco, No. 56214, slip op. at 3-4 (Ohio Ct App.
March 30, 1989) (1989 WL 30538 (Ohio App.)); Thompson's Supply Co. v. Vivio, No. 9562, slip op.
at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 26, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Ganguly v. Mead Digital Sys., No.
8225, slip op. at 1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 20, 1984) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file); Bradley v.
Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co. No. C-790508, slip op. at 3-5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1981) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file); Columbus Medical Equip. Co. v. Watters, 13 Ohio App. 3d 149, 151-52, 468 N.E.2d
343, 347 (1983); Harry Livingston, Inc. v. Stern, 69 Ohio App. 105, 108, 43 N.E.2d 302, 303-04 (1941).
32' Briggs v. Butter, 140 Ohio St. 499, 502, 509-11, 45 N.E.2d 757, 760, 763 (1942) (five years); Parma
Int'l, Inc. v. Herman, No 54243, slip op. at 4 (Ohio CL App. Feb. 16, 1989) (1989 WL 12928 (Ohio
App.)) (five years); Conforming Matrix Corp. v. Faber, 104 Ohio App. 8, 14, 146 N.E.2d 447, 451 (1957)
(five years); Toulmin v. Becker, 124 N.E.2d 778, 783-84 (Ohio CL App. 1954) (five years).
320

32 Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 57 Ohio St. 3d 5, 9, 565 N.E.2d 540, 544 (1991); Trim-Line of
Toledo, Inc. v. Carroll, No. L-86-176, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1987) (1987 WL 7056 (Ohio
App.)); Columbus Medical Equip. Co. v. Waiters, 13 Ohio App. 3d 149, 152, 468 N.E.2d 343, 348
(1983); Duracote Corp. v. Ryan, No. 1247, slip op. at 2 (Ohio Ct.App. April 15, 1983) (LEXIS, States
library, Ohio file). As the court of appeals observed in Trim-Line of Toledo, any other approach would
have the effect of "sanctioning litigation as a delay tactic". Slip op. at 2. If time were measured from
the date of termination, an employee could successfully defeat enforcement of a reasonable covenant by
simply delaying the conclusion of litigation until the restriction period had lapsed, thereby mooting the
controversy. Apparently oblivious to these authorities, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
in Moraine Indus. Supply, Inc. v. Sterling Rubber Prods. Co., 891 F.2d 133, 135-36 (6th Cir. 1989), that
a preliminary injunction enforcing a noncompetition covenant could not extend beyond the period of the
restraint as provided in the employment contract. The court relied upon authorities from other
jurisdictions but ignored what should have been controlling Ohio law in a diversity case. The Ohio
Supreme Court expressly disapproved the Sixth Circuit's holding in Rogers.
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Restrictive Covenants Incident to Other Relationships.

Although Judge Taft, writing in 1914, was able to identify five categories
of restrictive covenants recognized at common law, 23 the courts have since
recognized a number of additional settings in which restrictive covenants may be
appropriate.3
Restrictive covenants are frequently used in supplier-customer
relationships, joint ventures and licensing. As will be shown below, conventional
ancillary restraint analysis is equally applicable in evaluating restrictions in these
settings.
Supplier-CustomerRelationship. The supplier-customer relationship may
justify a restrictive covenant under a variety of different circumstances. If, for
example, the supplier is manufacturing a product pursuant to the specifications of
the customer, a covenant restricting the manufacturer from making and selling the
same product to a competitor of the customer may be reasonable.325 Under
Ohio law, any such restriction on a manufacturer's exploitation of its know-how
must be specifically provided for by contract; it will not be implied.3 26
Another restraint that may be appropriate in the supplier-customer
relationship is a promise by a distributor that he will not compete against his
supplier for a reasonable period of time after termination of the distribution
relationship. It was held in Ideal Milk Co. v. Blevins327 that such a covenant
of two years' duration, limited to the distributor's geographic territory, was
reasonable and therefore enforceable where the purpose of the restriction was to
"prevent the solicitation of plaintiff's customers" in the event the distributorship
was terminated.328
Although not discussed by the court, the identity of
plaintiff's customers was presumably confidential and proprietary and therefore
323W. TAFr, supra note 5. at 10.

Judge Taft had earlier itemized these five categories of restrictions in United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), as covenants incident to employment,
to the sale of a business or property or to creation and operation of a partnership. Id. at 281. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
325See, e.g., Gordon v. Deckebach, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 324, 326-27 (Dist. Ct. 1883) (enforcement of
restrictive covenant would be reasonable only until such time as patents were issued on secret
manufacturing process). Accord, e.g., Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 730 F.Supp. 1209,
1214-15 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (New York law; covenant enforced under "rule of reason" to prohibit
manufacturer from using for a ten-year period specifications of customer for the manufacturer of
commercial rack ovens).
326See Grob Plating Co. v. Kent-Owens Machine Co., 10 Ohio L Abs. 367, 369-71 (Ct. App. 1931).
'2 37 Ohio Misc. 76, 307 N.E.2d 278 (C.P. 1973).
'2 Id. at 78, 307 N.E.2d at 179.
34
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329 This
an appropriate subject for protection by means of a restrictive covenant.
kind of restraint very closely resembles, obviously, a noncompetition covenant
incident to employment. Although the distributor in Ideal Milk Co. was an
independent businessman, he could just as readily have been an employee and
perform the same functions.

A manufacturer may choose to impose a wide range of resale restrictions

on its dealers or distributors, and these have repeatedly been addressed under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. They run the gamut from a promise to sell the
product only from certain specified locations,330 to a promise not to sell to

customers outside a specific territory33' to a promise not to resell to certain
categories of customers.332 A manufacturer may also exact a promise from a
dealer or distributor not to carry goods competitive with those of the manufacturer.333 With the exception of resale price maintenance agreements, these
"vertical" ancillary restrictions are all subject to evaluation under the rule of
reason. 3 ' Although there is no inevitability to it, distribution restrictions of
these kinds have long been evaluated almost exclusively under the Sherman Act

or Valentine Act. There are virtually no common law Ohio decisions, 33 but the

The confidentiality of customer lists has repeatedly constituted the basis for enjoining deliverymen
from soliciting customers on routes they had worked or served on behalf of a former employer. See, e.g.,
Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 558-60, 147 N.E. 2d 724, 72628, 170 N.Y.S. 2d 328, 331-33 (1958); White Baking Co. v. Snell, 28 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 172, 176-79 (C.P.
1930). See generally Note, Customer Lists as Trade Secrets in Ohio, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 232, 240-47
(1966).
32

See generally 8
P.AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1641b (1989).
331 See, e.g., Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1986); Dart Inds., Inc.
v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1983). See generally 8 P.AREEDA, supra note 330, at

33 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977).

1641b.
See, e.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise Co., 686 F.2d 1190. 1195,1200-01 (6th Cir.
1982); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1005-07 (5th Cir.) (La. law,
following federal courts' application of Section I of the Sherman Act), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
See generally 8 P.AREEDA, supra note 330, at 1641c.
332

33 See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Inds., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 393-96 (7th Cir. 1984); Hendricks

Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc., 689 F.Supp. 1501, 1505-06, 1531-33, 1543 (N.D. IM. 1988). See generally
8 P. AREEDA, supra note 330, at 1610.
33 See. e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n. 18, 57 (1977). Vertical
agreements to fix prices have been deemed to be per se illegal under the Sherman Act and therefore not
subject to rule of reason evaluation. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
1620-40; supra note 186.
761 (1984). See generally 8 P. AREEDA, supra note 330, at
33 In at least one reported case, however, resale price maintenance agreements were held to be void and

unenforceable under Ohio's common law of restraints of trade. See Freeman v. Miller, 21 Ohio Dec. 766,
769-71 (Super. Ct. 1909).
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statutory analysis has evolved directly from, and very closely approximates,
analysis under the ancillary restraint doctrine. The legality of the restraints is
governed by the rule of reason. 336
Combinations Among Competitors. Agreements between competitors
made solely for the purpose of restricting competition are always void. By
definition, they restrain trade, and the Ohio courts have consistently declined to
enforce them.337 If, however, the agreement restricting competition between or
among the competitors is ancillary to a proper purpose, the agreement may be
enforceable.
Judge Boric had occasion to review restraints ancillary to a combination
among competitors in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.338
The case was decided under the Sherman Act, but its analysis of ancillary
restraints is equally applicable to restrictive covenants evaluated under contract
principles. The plaintiff, Rothery, was an authorized agent of Atlas Van Lines.
3

6 See, e.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656,665-69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 977 (1987); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1566-78 (11th Cir.

1983).
"7 See, e.g., Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio St. 320, 322, 24 N.E. 660, 660-61 (1890) (combination

among 95% of the manufacturers of candles east of Utah to increase the price and decrease the
manufacture of candles); Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666, 672 (1880) (combination of
salt manufacturers for the purpose of regulating the price and grade of salt); Hoffman v. Brooks, 6 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 1215, 1218 (Ct. App. 1884) (combination of tobacco warehousemen in Cincinnati for the
purpose of limiting competition and fixing prices); McBirney & Johnston White Lead Co. v. Consolidated
Lead Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 762,763-64 (Super. Ct. 1883) (combination among manufacturers of white
lead west of Buffalo for the purpose of restricting prices); Graf v. Master Horseshoers' Protective Ass'n,
15 Ohio Dec. 18, 22 (Super. Ct 1904) (price-fixing agreement among businesses engaged in horseshoeing
in Cincinnati); Needles v. Bishop & Babcock Co., 14 Ohio Dec. 445, 447-48 (C.P. 1904) (price-fixing
agreement among dealers in plumbing supplies). For a briefjudicial review of early decisions from other
states refusing to enforce agreements among competitors, see Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 338-41 (1904). See generally H. THOREUI. supra note 5, at 36-50; Hovenkamp, supra note 5,
at 1029-41.
There is some question whether such an agreement is unlawful under New York law. A
processor of scrap metal in Rochester agreed with its only competitor to refrain from shredding scrap for
sale to steel mills and other users in return for payment by the competitor of two percent of its annual
gross sales from the sale of shredded scrap for the next seven years. The appellate division of the New
York Supreme Court held that the contract was valid and enforceable under either New York law or the
Sherman Act. Atkin v. Union Processing Corp., 90 App. Div. 2d 332. 335-36, 457 N.Y.S.2d 152, 155-56
(4th Dep't 1982), affd mem., 59 N.Y.2d 919, 453 N.E.2d 522, 466 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1038 (1984). In opposing the denial of certiorari, Justice White expressed incredulity, noting
that the agreement was a naked market division between two direct competitors and therefore per se
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 465 U.S. at 1039-40. The decision may reflect an
idiosyncrasy of New York law in paying special deference to contracts that restrain trade between only
two parties. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 1035-36.
33 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
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Atlas is a nationwide common carrier of used household goods that has engaged
independent moving companies throughout the country as its agents. The
companies execute a standard agency contract with Atlas by which they agree to
adhere, when making shipments on Atlas' authority, to such terms as standard
operating procedures, maintenance and painting specifications and uniform
rates.33 9 When Rothery and other agents declined to comply with certain new
Atlas requirements, they were terminated. They subsequently sued, alleging that
they had been terminated pursuant to a group boycott comprised
of competing
34
moving companies that were participants in the Atlas system. 0
In analyzing whether the Atlas system constituted an unlawful combination of competitors, Judge Bork concluded that the restrictions imposed by Atlas
were necessary if the system were to function effectively. 34' Stated differently,
the "ancillary restraints are essential to the efficiency of a contract integration". 2 Without the restrictions, the system could not even exist, much less
function as an effective competitor:
...[T]hese

restraints are ancillary to the contract integration or
joint venture that constitutes the Atlas van line. The restraints
preserve the efficiencies of the nationwide van line by eliminating the problem of the free ride. There is, on the other hand, no
possibility that the restraints can suppress market competition and
so decrease output. Atlas has 6% or less of the relevant market,
far too little to make even conceivable an adverse effect upon
output. If Atlas should reduce its output, it would merely shrink
in size without having any impact on market price .... Under the
rule of Addyston Pipe & Steel, BMI, NCAA and Pacific Stationery, therefore, it follows that the Atlas agreements do not violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act.43
Restraints ancillary to agreements among competitors may be reasonable,
and therefore enforceable, on a variety of different grounds. In Rothery, the
ancillary restraints were necessary if the Atlas system were even to exist as a
competitor of other nationwide moving companies. Ancillary restraints may also

339

Id. at 211.

Id. at 213.
Id. at 229.
u2 Id.
30 Id. (footnote omitted).
30
4'
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be necessary for the purpose of carrying out research and development activities
that a single competitor could not efficiently carry out on its own. If the ancillary
restraints are essential to the existence of the combination, they may be
reasonable."
Although there appear to be no Ohio decisions addressing restraints
ancillary to combinations among competitors,? they should be subject to the
same rule of reason analysis as any other ancillary restraint. Specifically, is the
restraint reasonably limited in territory and duration and no broader than
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the covenantee?
Licensing. Covenants restraining competition may also be appropriate
with trademark or know-how licensing. If, for example, a party is given access
to valuable training, business assistance or confidential information pursuant to
a trademark license, the licensor may reasonably require, as a condition of the
license, that the licensee will refrain from directly competing against the licensor
following termination of the license. Franchise agreements typically provide for
this kind of restrictive covenant.
A transmission repair shop franchisor sought to enforce a post-termination
covenant in Interstate Automatic Transmission Co. v. W.H. McAlpine Co." In
evaluating whether to enforce the covenant against a former franchisee in the
Toledo area, the court observed that a covenant incident to a franchise agreement
has elements both of a covenant incident to an employment contract and one
incident to the sale of a business. 34' Citing Raimonde v. Van Vlerah,34s the

3" See, e.g., National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 601-02 (11th Cir. 1986)
(agreement among banks to fix credit card interchange rates was reasonable ancillary restraint); Hudson's
Bay Co. Fur Sales Inc. v. American Legend Coop., 651 F. Supp. 819, 839 (D.N.J. 1986) (reasonable
restraints ancillary to association of mink producers). Cf. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 401,
402-03 (1990) (territorial and price restrictions between competitors not ancillary to any proper purpose);
General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1984) (territorial
restraints agreed upon by members of trucking ass'n were not ancillary to main purpose of the ass'n);
Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1275-78 (1979) (restraints unreasonable), affd sub norm. Yamaha Motor
Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981). 2 See generally 2 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 0.02[4] (1989).

3 A partnership is not typically viewed as a joint venture or combination among competitors, but it can
be so viewed in the appropriate case. For an Ohio decision holding unreasonable a noncompetition
covenant ancillary to a partnership agreement between two physicians, see Droba v. Berry, 139 N.E.2d
124, 126-29 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
' No. C80-320 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library).
34 Id. slip op. at 1-2.
34 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).
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court observed that, under Ohio law, a noncompetition covenant must -- whether
incident to the sale of a business or to employment -- satisfy the following
criteria: (1) it must be ancillary to an otherwise lawful contract and reasonable
in duration and territorial scope; (2) it must be no greater than required to protect
the covenantee; (3) it must not impose undue hardship on the covenantor, and
(4) it must not be injurious to the public. 34 9
The court had no difficulty concluding that the one-year duration and tenmile radius of the covenant were reasonable, but it held that the covenant was
broader than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the covenantee.
Specifically, the covenant would have prevented the franchisee, if enforced, from
opening a transmission repair shop within ten miles of his former place of
business even though the franchisor was not operating another repair shop within
the franchisee's territory at the time of termination.350 The court held that the
covenant was therefore unreasonable and unenforceable.351
The court of appeals for Lucas County enforced a noncompetition
covenant against a former franchisee in DiscountMuffler Shops, Inc. v. Seely. 52
Pursuant to the franchise agreement, the franchisee promised that he would not
operate within 75 miles of Toledo a muffler installation business for a period of
three years following termination of his franchise agreement. 353 The franchisee,
Seely, breached the covenant and was sued by the franchisor. The court readily
concluded that the covenant was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate
interests of the franchisor:
The record further discloses that appellant [franchisor] provided
appellee [Seely] with the initial financing necessary to start the
business and offered some continued assistance in building the
business. Although the evidence is insufficient to establish that
appellant's method of operation constituted a trade secret, the
evidence does indicate that appellant's operations were sufficiently different from those of other muffler installers to provide

m9 No. C80-320, slip op. at 2.
"'Id. slip op. at 4-5.
"' For a similar holding, see American Nursing Care of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419, 432-33
(N.D. Ohio 1984) (Ohio law; enforcement of covenant against former franchisees would impose undue
hardship on franchisees and would exceed any protection reasonably needed by franchisor).
352 No. L-83-048 (Ohio CL App. July 1, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
3 Id. slip op. at 2-3.
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appellant with a significant competitive edge. Because appellee
operated his own shop under the franchise arrangement, appellee
also had sole direct contact with the customers of the shop.
Considering the foregoing factors, we find that some
restrictions prohibiting appellee from competing with appellant is
[sic] reasonably necessary to protect appellant's legitimate interests.

3
54

Following the holding in Raimonde that a court may reform an otherwise
unreasonable covenant, the court modified the covenant to extend 25 miles from
Toledo for a period of one year.355
The federal court in Akron applied a comparable analysis to enforce a
noncompetition covenant in Patio Enclosures, Inc. v. Swanson.356 The court
expressed some concern that Ohio law did not offer clear guidance on what
analysis should apply to evaluation of a noncompetition covenant incident to a
franchise agreement. 3 57 After reviewing authorities from other jurisdictions, the
court concluded that covenants incident to a franchise should not be analyzed in
the same fashion as covenants incident to an employment relationship. Instead,
the court reasoned that it would be preferable to emphasize that the franchise
noncompetition covenant should be viewed as one in which both of the parties are
"business entities" rather than employer-employee.358
The court explained the proper analysis for evaluation of the reasonableness of a noncompetition covenant incident to a franchise relationship in the
following terms:
In the absence of any guiding precedent from the Ohio Supreme
Court, the Court applies Ohio law in the same manner as the
Court expects that the Ohio Supreme Court would. The Court
finds that consideration of the reasonableness of Swanson's
covenant not to compete must include concerns applicable to the
sale and purchase of franchise materials between what are
3" Id. slip op. at 3.
33 id.
3-1 No. 5:90 CV 0328 (N.D. Ohio May 21, 1990) (unreported).
3- Id. slip op. at 12.
3M Id. slip op. at 16.
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essentially co-investing parties in the creation and maintenance
of franchise outlets. Thus, the reasonableness of a franchise
covenant not to compete depends upon the mutual protection of
the interests of the former franchisee, the remaining franchisees,
the franchisor and the general public. Having examined Raimonde, the Court finds that Raimonde is inapposite to the case at
hand because the restrictive test applied to an employee's
covenant not to compete fails to account for the additional
interests present in the franchisee-franchisor relationship. The
test of franchise covenant not to compete's enforceability is
whether the restrictionis reasonablynecessaryfor the protection
of the franchisor and remaining franchisees and whether an
undue hardship is placed upon the former franchisee by enforcement of the terms of the covenant. The two most common hardship concerns are the duration of time and geographical extent of
the limitation.359
The test in Patio Enclosures does not differ in any material respect from
the general formulation of the ancillary restraint doctrine of Lange v. Werk.
While it is understandable how the court, by focusing attention on the list of
reasonableness criteria in Raimonde,36 may have concluded that Ohio has
established a different test for evaluating restrictive covenants ancillary to
employment, this is not the case, as detailed in the preceding discussion.3 6 ' The
test formulated by the court for evaluating the reasonableness of a restrictive
covenant ancillary to a franchise relationship is entirely consistent with the
ancillary restraint doctrine generally.
In evaluating the ancillary restraints, the court eschewed any doctrinaire
adherence to formulae. For example, it turned aside the franchisee's contention
that the covenant could be enforced only if it could be shown that, without it, the
franchisor's trade secrets would be disclosed or its goodwill lost. 362 The court
explained that its evaluation of reasonableness was not confined to whether trade
secrets or goodwill had been compromised:

3" Id. slip op. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
mo These criteria are taken verbatim from Extine v. Williamson Midwest. Inc., 176 Ohio St. 403, 200
N.E.2d 297 (1964). For the text of the criteria, see supra note 229 and accompanying text.
361See supra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
No. 5:90CV 0328, slip op. at 19.
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While these are common elements used to justify enforcement of
a restrictive covenant in the employee setting, they are not the
only considerations, especially in the franchise setting. The
Court finds that Patio has a protectable interest in its method of
doing business. Further, because the franchise itself is a protectable interest, Patio may demonstrate harm arising from breach
of a franchisee's covenant not to compete without proving that its
information constitutes a trade secret. Although some courts
have found similar types of franchise information to be trade
secrets, the Court need not define the aid franchisor provides to
franchisees as a trade secret in order to enforce a restrictive
covenant signed by the frnchisee.363
Another licensing setting in which an ancillary restrictive covenant may
be appropriate is the licensing of know-how and trade secrets. Although there
appear to be no reported Ohio decisions addressing a restrictive covenant incident
to a know-how license, its reasonableness should be governed by the same
considerations that govern the reasonableness of any restrictive covenant. If the
promise to refrain from competing against the licensor of the know-how is limited
to the scope of the know-how licensed, the protection gained by the covenantee
should be no broader than that required for protection of its legitimate interests.3"
Whereas a promise by the licensee of a trade secret that it will not,
following termination of the licensing agreement, compete against the licensor can
readily be justified as necessary to protect the licensor against subsequent use,
even if inadvertent, of its trade secrets, it is difficult to see how any such
covenant could be justified incident to a patent license. The patent laws give the
owner of a patent a monopoly over its use, and any limitation on a former licens-

"a

Id. at 19-20 (footnote omitted). For an example of a case in which it was held that a noncompetition

covenant incident to a franchise agreement could not be enforced by the franchisor without proof of
threatened use by the franchisee of the franchisor's trade secrets, see Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc.,

732 F.Supp. 1034, 1044-45 (N.D. Cal. 1990). After concluding that the franchise noncompetition
covenant was subject to Section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code, prohibiting any
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a profession, trade or business, the court
considered whether the franchisor had satisfied the judicially-created exception to Section 16600 for
threatened use or disclosure by the former franchisee of the franchisor's trade secrets. Id.
16' For a thoughtful analysis of the reasonableness of ancillary restraints incident to a know-how license,
see Verson Wilkins Ltd. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 723 F.Supp. 1, 15-20 (N.D. i. 1989) (I. law). See
generally Note, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Secret Licensing: A Legal Review and Economic Analysis,
52 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROBs. 183, 194-96 (1989).
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ee's ability to compete against the licensor could be viewed as an unlawful
extension of the patent monopoly. 365 The former licensee could, of course,
infringe the patent by using it in competition with the licensor, but any protection
that the licensor may need against the activities of a former licensee is provided
by the patent monopoly.
The situation is different if know-how or trade secrets are the subject of
the license. They are, by their nature, ephemeral and their value to the licensor
inheres in their continued confidentiality. 3 6 If a former licensee makes use of
or discloses the trade secrets, they thereby cease to be the exclusive property of
the licensor, depriving the licensor of the competitive advantage their continued
secrecy gives.
V. Conclusion.
Judge Taft was confident in 1898 that he had identified all of the settings
in which restraints ancillary to a contract may be reasonable. 367 He could not
have foreseen the commercial developments that would later lead to widespread
use of these restraints in entirely new settings, including leases, franchises and
know-how licensing. He could, however, look back on nearly 200 years of
English and American decisions since Mitchel v. Reynolds36 and observe that
the ancillary restraint doctrine had been sufficiently flexible to have remained
during that period largely unchanged.
As this review of Ohio law shows, the doctrine retains its flexibility even
today. The Ohio Supreme Court has not materially added to or altered the
application of the doctrine since Judge Taft's decision in Addyston Pipe & Steel,
and the Court has never suggested any hybrid analysis for particular applications
of the doctrine. Whether the restraint under review is ancillary to the sale of a
business, a lease, employment, a franchise or other contractual relationship,
analytical uniformity is called for. The specific interests under review may differ
from one setting to another, but the method of evaluating reasonableness should
consistently focus on the competitive implications of the restraint. If the

36 See generally 8 E. LIPSCOMB, WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 28:22-:28 (3d ed. 1989).
3" See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-90 (1974), for discussion of the distinction

between trade secrets and patents.
30 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271. 281 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
3"

1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
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competitive benefits outweigh the adverse competitive effects, the rule of reason
is satisfied and the restraint should be enforced.
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